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An i n v e s t i g a t i o n into perverting influences i n 
category assessment s c a l e s , with p a r t i c u l a r 
reference to p r e c i s i o n i n tlio objective ascessirient 
of a t t i t u d e . Also a comparison between category 
s c a l i n g and an application of paired comparisons. 
'The wri t e r ' s a b r o a c h to p r e c i s i o n i n attitude 
s c a l i n g i s derived from an exposition of 
propoganda, defined i n terras of attitude, 
manipulation. 
•V'he at t i t u d e - a c t i o n discrepancy i s discussed i n 
r e l a t i o n to c u l t u r a l stereotypes and s t e r e o t y p i c a l 
behaviour. 
Categor,y s c a l i n g procedures are c r i t i c a l l y 
described and discussed, together with paired 
comparisons, Cutman scalograrn a n a l y s i s , and 
questionaire methodology. 
^xperiinents are c a r r i e d out to amplify and 
c l a r i f y the perverting influences on category 
s c a l i n g as discussed. Also experiments are 
c a r r i e d out to provide data on the r e l a t i v e 
p r e c i s i o n i n item s e l e c t i o n , and ease of a p p l i c a t i o n 
of category s c a l i n g methodologies and an a p p l i c a t i o n 
of paired comparisons. 
I.ultrole p a r t i a l ranking, an adaptation of 
paired comparisons, i s discussed i n r e l a t i o n 
to attitude s c a l i n g methodologies. 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
One sp e c i a l i s e d and very p r a c t i c a l aim i n psychology i s the use of 
words and images i n the manipulation of public opinion. I t cannot "be 
denied that public f e e l i n g and corporate conscience do su f f e r r a d i c a l 
changes i n the long term. This has i t s roots i n hist o r y , and i s d i f f i c u l t 
to predict i n direct i o n or extent beyond a r e l a t i v e l y short period. 
However, the business world has evolved techniques f o r influencing the 
man i n the s t r e e t , which increasingly undermine our b e l i e f i n our a b i l i t y 
to think f r e e l y for ourselves. Psychology can claim but marginal c r e d i t 
for these discoveries, though psychologists have undoubtedly contributed 
to t h e i r refinement and increasing sophistication. 
The production of materials intended to influence people i n both 
p o l i t i c a l behaviour and spending patterns i s best considered- a creative 
a r t . This cannot be considered remarkable since any s c i e n t i f i c process 
aimed at synthesising a f f e c t i v e statements depends on a knowledge of 
semantic relationships which are highly susceptible to time and s o c i a l / 
l i n g u i s t i c evolution; and t h i s knowledge does not yet e x i s t . 
A dictionary d e f i n i t i o n of a word i s quite inadequate for the form 
of 'semantic engineering' implied above. A combination of dictionary 
def i n i t i o n s and word counts could be of considerable value, though word 
counts f a i l on two important points; f i r s t l y they represent written rather 
than spoken words, and secondly they do not l i s t the frequencies of the 
various meanings attributed to s i m i l a r l y spelt words. What i s more a 
spoken word count would also have to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the s o c i a l 
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class/oocupation/education s p e c i f i c meanings of s i m i l a r l y pronounced 
words, l e t alone d i a l e c t variations and fashionable jargon. I t i s 
hardly su r p r i s i n g that no spoken word count has yet been published. 
I t i s l e f t to b a s i c a l l y n o n - s c i e n t i f i c s p e c i a l i s t s to produce 
material intended to influence people's opinions and behaviour, and most 
of t h i s cannot be considered more than merely short term manipulation. 
Thus attempts at p o l i t i c a l behaviour manipulation may have the sole aim 
of getting a p a r t i c u l a r person elected, and sales promotions are recognised 
as being of short term value only, being abandonned usually a f t e r a 
c e r t a i n period beyond which, experience has shown, they produce diminishing 
marginal returns against e f f o r t . 
I have avoided the use of the word 'attitude' i n the above. Definitions 
of attitude are various, and are frequently put forward with a p a r t i c u l a r 
purpose i n view. Allports d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of 'a mental . . . s t a t e , 
exerting . . . a dynamic influence . . . » i s perhaps the l e a s t exceptionable 
so f a r formulated yet i t remains undeniably an inferred intervening variable 
and i s i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d to the nature of the instrument used i n measuring 
i t . lysenck related opinion complexes with attitude, they being i t s verbal 
manifestations, while Jung had taken a more c l a s s i c a l d e f i n i t i o n , 
demonstrating introvert and extravert attitudes and r e l a t i n g them to 
personality types. Murphy went s t i l l further i n considering attitude an 
i n t e g r a l part of personality. 
I n any attempt to examine attitude, then, several f i e l d s of study 
must be encountered and catered for, more e s p e c i a l l y since research tools 
bear remarkable s i m i l a r i t i e s i n a l l these f i e l d s , and indeed i n many 
cases may be quite interchangeable. 
notwithstanding the variety of depth, or of the dependency or 
independancy attributed to 'attitude', i t i s commonly used as a blanket 
term for a subject's predispositions to act or express himself i n various 
ways. However, as intimated above, de f i n i t i o n s of attitude may be as 
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various as the tools used to measure them. These tools are almost 
invar i a b l y language based survey methods, and t h i s work w i l l examine 
one p a r t i c u l a r genus of survey methods commonly c a l l e d category s c a l i n g 
procedures. 
The investigation of mental states exerting dynamic influences, or 
of predispositions to act i n c e r t a i n ways i s perhaps one of the most 
int r i g u i n g l y d i f f i c u l t i n s o c i a l psychology. I n pure psychophysics 
the r e s u l t s tend to j u s t i f y the assumption that whatever variable i s 
controlled i s i n f a c t the primary cause of any r e s u l t s obtained. I n 
investigating attitude only physical manifestations of attitude-potent 
stimuli can be varied, and t h i s i s the crux of the problem. Waatever 
aspect of a t e s t s i t u a t i o n i t i s chosen to vary, e i t h e r i t i s assumed 
that at l e a s t the true attitude quality of the change i s known, or 
v a r i a t i o n s are made quite randomly with a view to i s o l a t i n g common 
factors against common r e s u l t s . I n the f i r s t instance i t may be argued 
that the variables involved i n t h i s kind of experiment are too complex 
for such naive assumptions, and i n the second only physical differences 
i n the t o t a l stimulus may be analysed and the 'true' underlying factors 
may remain concealed, to be brought to l i g h t only i n the framework of some 
established theory. 
To examine t h i s further l e t us consider interpersonal attitude-potent 
situations as analogous to phrases of spoken language. As the precise 
meaning of a phrase or i t s units may be disputed, so a s i t u a t i o n may not, 
and perhaps cannot, mean the same to any two observers. The l i n g u i s t i c 
analogy may, with caution, be taken yet further i n that l i n g u i s t i c 
sophistication can convey and deteet more variations and precise nuances. 
We may now consider again the mechanisms of propoganda. I w i l l begin 
with the controversial assertion that l o g i c a l argument i n the conventional 
sense i s v i r t u a l l y worthless as a potent opinion/attitude influence. 
There i s however a perverse l o g i c i n the effectiveness of r e p e t i t i o n as a 
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promotion method. A product or person i s seldom sold to the public on 
t h e i r physical i n t e g r i t y , or on unbiassed factual evidence of t h e i r 
potency; rather the public i s told that such and such i s the truth, 
and there i s ample evidence for the effectiveness of such assertions. 
What i s the superiority of one dogmatised truth over another? The 
answer shows where the propoganda a r t i s t succeeds over the s c i e n t i s t . 
There can surely he nothing inherent i n t i g e r s ' t a i l s to a f f e c t the 
octane r a t i n g of pe t r o l , or a blue boy blowing bubbles the power of 
soap, yet these have proved very e f f e c t i v e i n the past i n s e l l i n g t h e i r 
related products. The answer l i e s i n the genius of an individual or a 
group i n r e a l i s i n g how, within the context of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l / 
h i s t o r i c a l instant or epoch, words or images (actual or conceptual) 
may be juxtaposed to represent a dogmatised assertion powerful enough 
to achieve for i t s e l f the i d e n t i t y of a perversely l o g i c a l truth. The 
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a r t i n t h i s i s the coyerete, though seldom conscious r e a l i s a t i o n of some 
underlying factor i n the psychological makeup of a majority of a 
population to be propogandised, and the r e l a t i o n to i t of physical and 
mental images which maximise the play on t h i s underlying factor. I n 
productive terms i t i s useless to play to a psychological factor which 
w i l l not evoke some positive action, so we must return to a factor which 
implies a propensity to act, and thus to some manifestation of affeetive 
attitude. 
Considering the complex and often intangible influencers of opinion 
we may question not only the d e f i n i t i o n of attitude, but also the quality 
measured i n survey methods. An i d e a l experiment would consist of the 
surreptitious engineering of a sit u a t i o n i n such a way that subjects' 
responses may be p r e c i s e l y monitored without the obvious presence of an 
experimenter or indeed an experiment. To some extent t h i s i s obtained at 
election times or during intensive s a l e s promotions. We want to know the 
precise e f f e c t of a campaign designed to influence subjects' actions, and 
from these we i n d i r e c t l y i n f e r t h e i r attitudes, and election returns or 
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s a l e s figures can be considered t h i s r e s u l t i f prudently analysed. 
However, there are few occasions of d i r e c t i n t e r e s t to the s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i s t where such an approach may be used, though some w i l l be 
described below. An a t t r a c t i v e and f a r e a s i e r method i s to present 
hypothetical s i t u a t i o n s to a subject and to ask him to describe how 
he would respond, the f a l l a c y of t h i s approach has been amply 
demonstrated, and the lessons from i t s frequent f a i l u r e slowly and often 
expensively learned (see Chapter 2). F a i l u r e of t h i s method may be 
attributed to f a i l u r e of the hypothetical s i t u a t i o n posed to conform 
f u l l y with the actual s i t u a t i o n i n l i f e . Perhaps the hypothetical 
situation f a i l s to represent a l l the concrete facts of a l i f e s i t u a t i o n , 
or perhaps a subject i s too e a s i l y able to alienate the s i t u a t i o n from 
himself, and to respond i n terms of only a limited number of attitude 
sets representing a f e l t i d e a l or desirable approach. The precise mech-
anism of t h i s f a i l u r e i s outside the scope of t h i s paper, the only 
pertinent f a c t being the f a i l u r e per se. 
Let us look at the nature of the t e s t items described above. Words 
and f i g u r a l or f igurative images are presented to a subject. The images 
are the p r i n c i p a l controlled variable i n a complex psychosocial experiment, 
other variables being the s i t u a t i o n i n which and the people to whom they 
are presented. By holding the population constant the e f f e c t of varying 
the mode or s i t u a t i o n of presentation may be studied. The r e s u l t i n g 
findings may lead to questionable conclusions about the nature of the 
presentation s i t u a t i o n s , since i t may not be v a l i d to assume a p a r t i c u l a r 
s i t u a t i o n i s the same for a l l members of any otherwise apparently 
homogeneous group, fo amplify t h i s , humans are notoriously f i c k l e , and 
although a p a r t i c u l a r group may respond with a great deal of consonance 
i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , which may i n fact define the group, there i s no 
reason to suppose they w i l l agree i n a l l t h e i r responses. Child rearing 
p r a c t i c e s , for example, i n any s o c i a l c l a s s are v a r i a b l e , and even within 
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a single family i t may not be assumed that two children w i l l s u f f e r the 
same formative experiences. The same i s true throughout l i f e , and i t 
would be a poorer world i f i t were otherwise, a l b e i t a more amenable 
world for the s c i e n t i s t . We have then, a group of individuals who recog-
ni s e themselves as dedicated to common alms, but who have come to behave 
i n t h i s way by v i r t u e of varied pressures and experiences. We may study 
gross differences between groups, but the individual differences within 
groups seems to have been la r g e l y ignored, even though such an approach 
might y i e l d a f a r more useful d e f i n i t i o n of the group. This approach i s 
derived from Maslow's exortation to study normal rather than abnormal 
populations. Extreme subgroups of a population may be e a s i l y defined 
s u p e r f i c i a l l y , and r e s u l t s obtained w i l l invariably demonstrate 
differences between such groups, but t h e i r relevance to *normal' people 
i s questionable. We may conclude that we cannot assume any two other-
wise s i m i l a r l y opinioned people to have the same attitudes. They respond 
to s i m i l a r situations i n s i m i l a r ways, but we may not assume that the 
events are i n fact perceived s i m i l a r l y ; 
A s i t u a t i o n or an event may be perceived d i f f e r e n t l y by otherwise 
apparently s i m i l a r l y reared and opinioned individuals by virtue of two 
c l o s e l y related factors. F i r s t l y a person's education, e x p l i c i t and 
i m p l i c i t , i n both formal and family senses, must preclude or emphasise 
many words and individual meanings of a word. And secondly the reactions 
of peers to c e r t a i n words or modes of expression impress a subtle, though 
nonetheless potent, meaning. Thus we return to the semantic content of 
a word or unit of meaning or expression. 
I would conclude from t h i s argument that methodologies based on the 
presentation of hypothetical situations only begin to measure one minor 
parameter of the complex s o c i a l stimulus - s o c i a l response paradigm. 
The term 'semantic engineering' was mentioned above, and although 
i t s meaning might appear immediately comprehensible i t i s worthwhile 
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expanding on i t here. 
I n d u s t r i a l work study and job evaluation techniques have been 
evolved for synthesising the time aspect of time and motion studies. 
I n most c r a f t s k i l l s there are many operations which are common to 
different tasks; these might be tightening a nut, applying c a l l i p e r s , 
or simply moving from one part of a work bench to another. Over the 
years accurate mean times for such operations have been established 
which eliminate much tedious and imprecise stopwatch work. However, 
variation s i n the precise time for a s p e c i f i c operation are accepted 
according to the context of the operation, fhus ambient temperature, 
time of day, length of task or simply the previous movement may a l l 
influence the time taken. 
A system analogous to that above i s what i s meant by semantic 
engineering. Statements may be synthesised from basic u n i t s , and the 
precise meaning of these statements would be known under any defined 
contextual s i t u a t i o n . The context consists of many potent aspects of 
the si t u a t i o n i n which a subject finds himself, as for instance the 
subject's own psychological makeup and the presence of c e r t a i n i n f l u e n t i a l 
people or things i n the environment. Thus mere dictionary d e f i n i t i o n s 
or word counts are useless i n themselves, the only approach of any value 
being Osgood et a l ' s work on semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , though d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of t h e i r approach w i l l be discussed l a t e r . 
Let us speoulate on how such a system might be operated. Every word 
or standard unit of meaning or expression would be defined i n terms of 
multiple vectors, each representing a form of 'action press' dependant on 
ce r t a i n aspects of sit u a t i o n context. This would specify the most 
probable actions to be e l i c i t t e d by the presentation of the unit of 
expression i n any definable context. 
However, the presence of any such unit of expression would also 
constitute a modification of the experimental context for the subject, 
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and the presence of two or more such u n i t s forming a coherent statement 
would require the computation of a f i n a l vector for a s i t u a t i o n whose 
context i s defined by the subject, in c i d e n t a l aspects of the environment, 
and the semantic vectors of the constituent parts of the statement i t s e l f , 
a l l mutually dependant and modifying one another. The mathematics of 
such a statement i n any defined s i t u a t i o n would t h e o r e t i c a l l y enable 
precise prediction of a subject's response. However, the system presents 
the dilemma of chickens and eggs, or horses and c a r t s . Semantic 
engineering as here described requires techniques for measuring attitude 
at a l e v e l of precision which we have not yet attained; and the construc-
tio n of such techniques would require a knowledge of attitude which perhaps 
they alone could be instrumental i n compiling. 
As yet i t i s only productive to think of semantic engineering i n 
terms of attitude measurement rather than propoganda. 
Attitude scale construction con s i s t s of the s e l e c t i o n of c e r t a i n 
items of a number constructed which w i l l exhibit a c l e a r cutoff point i n 
r e l a t i o n to a defined attitude. Thus as we approach subjects with 
increasing degrees of a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d i n a l a t t r i b u t e , we would hope to 
f i n d a very short range of potency of t h i s attribute within which 
responses to a p a r t i c u l a r item w i l l exhibit a sharp q u a l i t a t i v e or 
quantitative change. I n fact the most common method of item selection 
i s to take responses or subject groups recognised as representing 
polarised opposites i n terms of the attitude to be studied. Even 
accepting a wide spread of opinion within such groups, an item shown to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e accurately between them cannot be assumed to conform to 
our model, since there may be a very large range within which no responses 
have occurred. The r e s u l t of diffuse changeovers rather than sharp cut-
offs i s that banks of such items w i l l f a i l to measure subjects i n the mid 
range with the accuracy they do at the extremes. 
The semantic engineering approach would aid t h i s procedure i n two 
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ways. An experimenter would no longer have to construct a large number 
of statements to be sorted, vetted and reduced by a great band of 
judge/subjects, since the nature of the attribute expressed i n a l l the 
statements would be controlled within tolerable l i m i t s . Also the 
precision of the cutoff would be i m p l i c i t i n each statement's semantic 
vector geometry. I d e a l l y therefore, opinion/attitude scale construction, 
as well as the production of propoganda materials, would be a matter of 
synthesis by computer i n hours or only minutes, rather than months or 
even years of hard physical e f f o r t ; and the tedious processes of 
c a l i b r a t i o n and v a l i d a t i o n would be a thing of the past. 
This i s the background against which the present t h e s i s was 
formulated. So many factors are involved that i t would be the l i f e t i m e 
work of a team to resolve a l l the problems. I n t h i s t h e s i s only one 
topic i s approached, and even then the problems would appear to multiply 
rather than diminish. However, even though the background would appear 
ambitious, the r e s u l t s are cogently applicable to more mundane present-
day problems i n category s c a l i n g methodology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Studies r e l a t i n g to attitude as an abstract quality 
I n 1934 Richard T, LaPierre published the c l a s s i c paper "Attitudes 
vs. Actions". Between 1930 and 1932 LaPierre t r a v e l l e d extensively about 
the United States i n the company of a young Chinese couple. Out of 251 
establishments v i s i t e d , services were refused on r a c i a l grounds i n only 
one, while a questionaire presented s i x months l a t e r i n the same and 
other establishments showed positive expressed r a c i a l discrimination i n 
9O70 of both the establishments v i s i t e d and a control group of others not 
v i s i t e d . I n such circumstances LaPierre quite r i g h t l y questioned the 
v a l i d i t y of questionaire data, emphasising the u n r e a l i t y of the 
hypothetical s i t u a t i o n as presented i n the questionaire. 
A study by Corey (1937) reached s i m i l a r conclusions to LaPierre's 
a f t e r examining possible reasons for the lack of v a l i d i t y studies i n 
questionaire methodology. He showed how r e s u l t s on attitude questionaires 
tended to be accepted as v a l i d by the experimenter when they conformed to 
a c l a s s stereotype, and p a r t i c u l a r l y to that of the experimenter. 
Despite t h i s evidence of the attitude/action discrepancy at such an 
early date Linn (19^5) demonstrates the continuing tendency to ignore i t . 
Tarter (1966) accounts for the discrepancy by suggesting the subject 
reacts to what he believes the s i t u a t i o n to be, and hence Tarter finds 
the discrepancy e n t i r e l y acceptable. 
A p a r e l l e l approach to the problem i s given i n studies which take 
an oblique approach to attitude. Instead of attempting to i d e n t i f y 
individual attitudes or to hold constant and quantify a p a r t i c u l a r 
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a t t i t u d i n a l quality, items are presented i n such a fashion that the 
subject may be influenced i n d i r e c t l y i n h i s assessment by an indefinable 
l e v e l of 'prestige' attributed under that guise. Thus Lambert, Hodgson, 
Gardner & Pillenbaum (1960) and Anisfeld, Bogo & Lambert (1962) showed 
reactions to c a r e f u l l y controlled items of spoken language. Results of 
these studies demonstrated the potency of community stereotypes, some 
c u l t u r a l l y l e s s favoured groups expressing some stereotypes of t h e i r own 
group more strongly than did the dominant group. 
Frances (l?63) showed the e f f e c t of a t t r i b u t i n g a work to a known 
prestigious author; t h i s was to r a i s e the general opinion of the quality 
of the work and to reduce the judged superiority of works judged better. 
As l e v e l of education decreased, so the e f f e c t of the a t t r i b u t i o n of the 
work to a famous author decreased. A s i m i l a r and more s p e c i f i c finding 
was shown i n Greenberg (1966), when preference to newspaper vs. t e l e v i s i o n 
newscoverage was studied. Sex and education were shown to be quite 
independant and potent influences on the b e l i e v e a b i l i t y attributed to the 
different media, while age was shown to be a bad predictor. Anast (l$€6) 
showed c l e a r relationships between mass media preferences and Jungian 
personality type. 
F i n a l l y , r e f e r r i n g again to Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner & Fillenbaum 
(196O) and Anisfeld, Bogo & Lambert (1962) above, Gardner, Wommacott & 
Taylor (1968) showed the s t a b i l i t y of nationally held stereotypes across 
subcultural groups, suggesting t h i s stereotype i s independant of i n d i v i d u a l 
attitudes towards the group evaluated. 
From these studies i t may be seen that many intangibles are involved 
i n the attitude/action process. Conventional methods i n which groups 
i d e n t i f i e d with c e r t a i n attitudes are examined, may f a i l to account for 
say educational or personality differences, and thus some factors apparently 
independant of the major a t t i t u d i n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s might appear blurred 
where they i n f a c t exert d e f i n i t e underlying influences. Also some 
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reactions, notably to national stereotypes, show a great degree of 
independence from national sub-group i d e n t i t y , and thus no differences 
may be found where r a d i c a l differences do i n fact occur. 
On the whole the above studies used techniques other than the 
category scales to be described below. The conclusions may therefore 
be taken as independant from other perturbing influences yet to be 
demonstrated. Where used, quantitative methods were not assumed to 
represent absolute quantities, rather they were mere indicators of 
differences. 
We have then a body of evidence to suggest that there are influences 
on expressed attitude which might e i t h e r completely mask a p a r t i c u l a r 
a t t i t u d i n a l a t t r i b u t e , thus leading the investigator to conclude no 
relationship, or e l s e they may emerge unpredictably during investigation 
of an attribute perhaps c l o s e l y though not obviously related. In both 
cases attempted measurement of a defined attribute may not n e c e s s a r i l y 
lead to the correct prediction of a c e r t a i n course of action. 
Measurement of defined a t t i t u d i n a l attributes has become reasonably 
precise. Before predictions may be made we must have before us some 
instrument with an acceptably low degree of imprecision. Whether v a l i d 
or not we may then r e l a t e success of prediction with the precise measure. 
Apart from the action/attitude discrepancy described above, the nature 
of LaPierre's 'hypothetical s i t u a t i o n ' as presented i n questionaires 
merits further study. Prom the introductory remarks, the w r i t e r assumes 
that response formats represent inte g r a l parts of the questionaire 
items, and an effect analogous to that which might be predicted from 
t h i s assumption has been demonstrated i n Blankenship (1940)» i n which 
response formats were shown to af f e c t the range of validly, drawable 
conclusions quite apart from the question wording i t s e l f . This might be 
due s o l e l y to the response option as presented, however t h i s paper w i l l 
attempt to i s o l a t e such perturbing influences of a purely psychophysical 
nature. 
Precision i n attitude measurement i s not enough. One random group 
may well show responses s i m i l a r to another's, but perturbing influences 
inherent i n the scale construction might originate at a purely psycho-
physical l e v e l , and thus s i m i l a r scalings would be s i m i l a r l y perturbed. 
Before extending t h i s argument l e t us examine the attitude i n s t r u -
ments most commonly proposed; and p a r t i c u l a r l y the category sc a l i n g 
procedures. 
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CHAPTER 5 ' 
Attitude measurement 
There are many techniques used i n the study of a t t i t u d e s . For 
many reasons inventories and questionaires are preferable to interview 
and analytic techniques. Their obvious advantages are i n the realm of 
quantification while a by-product i s a sometimes spurious a i r of s c i e n t i f i c 
v a l i d i t y . 
Most attitude assessment techniques can be considered s p e c i a l i s e d 
psychophysical methods. The category methods to be described below are 
e s s e n t i a l l y custom b u i l t for the purpose. However, a central topic of 
t h i s essay i s the method of paired comparisons which came to the f i e l d 
of attitudes from a long career as a more general psychophysical technique 
from what may be c a l l e d the ,^hysicopsychologists ,. I t was f i r s t and i s 
s t i l l used as a tool i n the study of completely tangible physical 
e n t i t i e s such as colour and sound tones. I t s application to s o c i a l 
psychology as well as that of the category s c a l i n g methods i s described 
i n t h i s chapter. 
The method of paired comparisons involves the comparison of every item 
of an item population 'm' with every other item. In p r a c t i c a l terms 
every subject must make a binary decision on each of ^Cg p a i r s of items. 
I t i s u s u a l l y desirable that each p a i r be administered but once to each 
subject, to minimise the work load on the subject and to avoid 
complications i n the procedures used i n the an a l y s i s of the r e s u l t s . 
The data thus gathered are used to calculate the r e l a t i v e scale 
values of the items on an hypothetical psychological continuum. The. 
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method of obtaining these r e l a t i v e scale values i s based on Thurstone's 
Law of Comparative Judgement explained belowt-
When confronted with a s e r i e s of items to be judged, one must 
consider an attri b u t e common to a l l the items and which they possess to 
different degrees. I f one item appears to possess more of t h i s attribute 
than another then i t i s said to have a higher discriminal process. 
The discriminal process i s the process within us by which we react 
d i f f e r e n t l y to different items, objects or specimens. 
The most common discriminal process experienced to a p a r t i c u l a r 
object by a p a r t i c u l a r subject i s c a l l e d the object's modal discriminal 
process for that subject. 
The separation between the discriminal process at any instant and 
the modal discriminal process i s c a l l e d the discriminal deviation. 
The standard deviation of the discriminal deviations evidenced by 
a subject to an object i s c a l l e d the discriminal dispersion of that 
object for that subject. 
The diacriminal difference i s the difference between the evoked 
discriminal processes for two objects i n the same judgement. 
The law may now be concisely stated 
S.- S. = z. . / <?. + o 2. - 2r. .o\o\ 
where S. & S. are the modal diseriminal processes of the two objects 
I & J i n the same judgement, o\ & a*, are the d i s c r i a i n a l dispersions of 
3 
the two objects, r^.. i s the correlation between the discriminal 
deviations of the two discriminal processes i n the same judgement, and 
z. . i s the normal deviate of the proportion of judgements ( I > J ) . 
Consider the equation above applied to m items examined i n a paired 
comparison s i t u a t i o n . For each p a i r there w i l l be an equation l i k e that 
_ 2 
above i n terms of S, a*, z, and r . There w i l l be (m - m)/2 expressions. 
These expressions must be used to deduce each value of S from to S m > 
each value of d from cf- to <f , and every value of r. .. There are thus 
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2m + (m - m)/2 unknowns, but only (m - m)/2 expressions. I n t h i s form 
the law of comparative Judgements i s therefore insoluble. 
Thurstone prooeded to make ce r t a i n assumptions about the r e l a t i v e 
values of the unknown quantities i n order to make the equation soluble. 
The more assumptions that may be made the e a s i e r the solution:-
( i ) r i s p r a c t i c a l l y constant throughout the stimulus s e r i e s for 
the single observer. 
( I I ) when a group of observers perceives an o b j e c t r the quantity 
of attribute that they ascribe to i t i s normally distributed on the 
continuum of perceived attrib u t e . 
( I l l ) r - 0 
(IV) o*. = (o\ + d) where d i s so small that d may be ignored, i J 
( ? ) a l l discriminal dispersions are equal. 
Ehese assumptions simplify the equation tot-
S. - S. - I.4142 z.. i 3 i j 
And t h i s i s c a l l e d Thurstone's 'case Y\ of the law of comparative 
judgement since i t was the r e s u l t of the f i f t h simplifying assumption. 
'The purpose of the law of comparative judgements i s to deduce the 
scale values of the items examined on a defined psychological continuum 
such that these values are at l e a s t l i n e a r l y r elated to the 'true' modal 
discriminal processes. 
I n a s e r i e s of papers, Mosteller (1951 a, b & c) presents perhaps 
the most concise examination of Thurstone's law of comparative judgement. 
Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y he shows that where the assumption of equal 
discriminal dispersions holds for a l l but one of the items scaled, the 
r e s u l t i s for a l l the items to be properly distributed except for the 
aberrant one. He also derives a formula for the amount of error due to 
t h i s aberrant item where a l l the assumptions of case V are accepted. 
Greenberg (l$65) proposes a modification of the law of comparative 
judgements to accommodate judgements of 'equal* or 'no differende' rather 
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than forcing choices. I n effect the modification approximates the ad hoc 
procedure of d i s t r i b u t i n g the * equal» judgements equally between the 
items i n the p a i r . However, on purely p r a c t i c a l grounds the technique 
appears u s e f u l . 
With quite different considerations i n mind, and independant of the 
r e s t r i c t i n g assumptions of case V, Kendall (1948) presents a method 
for examining a set of paired comparison data to determine whether 
they represent a s i g n i f i c a n t l y non-random set of choices. Thus m items 
administered to n subjects by paired comparison may be perceived by a l l 
the subjects as representing more or l e s s the same thing, and i f so t h e i r 
choices w i l l show some degree of concurrence. A random set of choices 
would not be meaningfully scalable by the law of comparative judgements, 
though r e s u l t s might be obtained, and should show as random by Kendall's 
method. Hosteller ( i b i d ) presents a s i m i l a r technique based on the law 
of comparative judgements case 7. Kendall's method examines each subject's 
set of paired comparison responses for ' c i r c u l a r t r i a d s ' ; that i s for 
judgements of the nature A>B, B>C, 0>A, which appear inconsistent with 
the notion of an undimensional continuum of items. Judgements should 
be of the nature A>B, B>C, C<A. The use of t r i a d s as a unit of 
quantification i s challenged by S l a t e r (1961) who maintains that since 
each t r i a d consists of three pairs and any p a i r appears i n m-2 t r i a d s , 
t r i a d s are not s t r i c t l y independant of one another. The r e s u l t i s to 
weight some inconsistent responses more than others. S l a t e r ' s solution 
i s i n terms of the actual number of these inconsistent responses insofar 
as they may be i d e n t i f i e d . This i s a useful tool making as i t does no 
assumption about the unidimensionality of the items judged. However, i t 
has c e r t a i n p r a c t i c a l disadvantages i n computation rendering i t more 
cumbersome than Kendall's with no r e a l advantage i n power e f f i c i e n c y . 
I n constructing a scale by the method of paired comparisons a number 
of statements i s collected each of which expresses some sort of comment 
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upon the object the subjects' attitude towards which we hope to measure. 
These statements are presented i n p a i r s to each of a group of judges, 
and each judge i s asked to say which of each p a i r represents a more 
favourable comment on the object of the statements. Application of the 
law of comparative judgements establishes the r e l a t i v e scale values of 
the statements on a continuum of perceived favourableness-unfavourableness 
of comment. 
fo apply the f i n a l scale, a subject i s inv i t e d to agree or disagree 
with the sentiments expressed i n the scaled statements and h i s score i s 
taken as the median of the scale values of the statements he endorsed. 
The statements used i n t h i s form of scale are usually s p e c i a l i s e d 
and selected or constructed, and few i n number. There are r e l a t i v e l y 
few statements because of the disproportionate increase i n ^Cg (the 
number of pairs to be presented to each subject) with increasing m. I n 
fact few workers have attempted to use more than t h i r t y items while a 
more usual number i s l e s s than ten. Thus the method has r a r e l y i f ever 
been used as a method of item s e l e c t i o n but has tended to use a l l the 
items examined i n i t s f i n a l form as an attitude s c a l e . 
In an attempt to cope with the disproportionate increase i n 
with increasing m, methods have been proposed whereby instead of responding 
to each pai r separately, small samples of items from m are put i n rank 
order by the subjects. Durbin (1951) proposed the use of conventional 
balanced incomplete blocks and Youden square designs which offers a 
p a r t i a l solution to the problem of ranking a large number of items. 
Schucker (1959) proposed the administration of groups of only three items 
at a time and indicated methods s i m i l a r to those of Durbin for generating 
the 'triads' to be administered. The important difference between these 
techniques was that Schucker envisaged the t r i a d s as consisting of three 
individual p a i r s to be analysed as simple paired comparisons, while 
Durbin used the method to gain as estimate of the population rank orders 
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of the items. 
S l a t e r (19&5) proposed a more general method than that of Sehucker, 
i n which, subject to c e r t a i n l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s , up to 28 items may be 
so construed that a l l the p a i r s are presented as constituent p a i r s 
within groups of 3, 4 or 5 items to be ranked. Consider an item population 
m; a l l the constituent ^Cg pa i r s must be presented to a subject within a 
331^2 
number of groups a l l s i z e x, i . e . , Q0 p a i r s at a time. Thus only -=~ 
X Z x G2 
presentations of groups of x items iieed be made for a l l the p a i r s to be 
administered. The l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s are:-
S l a t e r gives no indication i n h i s paper as to any convenient techniques 
for generating h i s presentation groups, and indeed i n a private 
communication admitted no knowledge of any such techniques, prefering 
•the mental exercise rather l i k e a game of patience" of generating them 
by hand. However, Dr. D. F a i r l e y of the Department of Mathematics at 
Durham University indicated an i t e r a t i v e method whereby the necessary 
presentation groups (which maj}(.he, greater than S l a t e r ' s maximum of x=5) 
can be e a s i l y generated providing m i s a prime, and which with some adapta-
t i o n lends i t s e l f to c e r t a i n other values of m. 
Sjoberg (1965) examined four different methods of scoring paired 
comparisons data. He used case ¥, case IV with an estimate of the 
discriminal dispersions for the items derived from the data, successive 
i n t e r v a l s a n a l y s i s , and h i s own c o r r e l a t i o n a l s c a l i n g . He showed that 
case V produced a f a r worse l e a s t squares f i t than the other methods, 
while successive i n t e r v a l s s c a l i n g was marginally better than the r e s t . 
A c r i t i c i s m of the use of paired comparisons i n advertising research 
x - I must be an integer 
m >x(x-l) 
a 2 = m mfm-l) x ( x - I 
must be an integer 
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by Blankenship (1966) emphasises the purely r e l a t i v e nature of scale 
values derived from paired comparisons, i n that no absolute value can be 
attributed to a paired comparison scale value since i t i s dependant on 
the t o t a l item sample examined. He shows how the use of the 'winner' i n 
paired comparisons can lead to confounded expectations where a l l the 
options examined are absolute 'losers'. 
Subsequent to h i s work on paired comparisons, fhurstone developed 
a procedure for s c a l i n g statements which was f a r l e s s cumbersome and 
provided an objective means of item selection (Thurstone & Ghave 1929). 
t h i s came to be c a l l e d the method of Equal Appearing I n t e r v a l s . Since i t 
i s s t i l l widely used and since i n many respects i t i s representative of 
other s c a l i n g procedures, i t w i l l receive lengthy attention i n t h i s 
paper. 
To produce an equal appearing i n t e r v a l scale f i r s t l y gather together as 
many statements as possible descriptive of the object under examination, 
fhey should represent opinions about the object ranging from most to 
l e a s t favourable through neutral opinions. These statements are then 
rated by a number of judges (as many as 900 and as few as 16 judges have 
been used) on a 9 or 11 point scale from l e a s t to most favourable with 
the centre category defined as 'neutral', The responses are cumulated 
across categories over subjects to produce an ogival curve of responses 
to each item. The median of the responses for an item i s taken as that 
item's scale value. 
Thurstone then selected twenty or more items more or l e s s equally 
spaced along the scale. Where there was a choice the item with the 
smallest i n t e r q u a r t i l e range was chosen since Thurstone considered t h i s 
a measure of ambiguity. 
When used as a t e s t these selected items are presented to the 
subject who i s invited to agree or disagree with each item i n turn. His 
scale value i s then taken as the median of the scale values of those 
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items he endorsed. 
As implied i n the t i t l e t h i s method assumes that as a judge sorts 
items into the various categories he perceives the category widths to be 
the same throughout the continuum. This might be considered a questionable 
assumption. I n order to account for t h i s ©lurstone developed the 
Method of Successive I n t e r v a l s i n which items are rated as i n the method 
of equal appearing i n t e r v a l s , responses are cumulated across categories, 
and a procedure i s ca r r i e d out which normalises a l l the r e s u l t i n g ogival 
curves by finding the normal deviates corresponding/each successive 
r 
cumulative proportion, thus s h i f t i n g category boundaries. I n essence the 
extreme categories are widened. The scale values of the items are the 
median responses on the new 'unequal' i n t e r v a l continuum and s e l e c t i o n , 
administration and scoring are otherwise as i n the method of equal 
appearing i n t e r v a l s . 
The l i t e r a t u r e on Thurstone s c a l i n g i s extensive, and i t would be 
neither p r a c t i c a l nor useful to summarise i t here. The following 
represent the most recent information on the contemporary use and 
theory of the methods. 
Upshaw's 1962 a r t i c l e was an important step i n the study of the 
relationship between judges' attitudes' e f f e c t s on scale values derived 
from t h e i r judgements. TJpshaw contended that a judge's ratings of a set 
of items depended on the range of these items and t h e i r relationship to 
h i s a t t i t u d i n a l position at the time of judging. He shows that where 
an item population only covers one extreme of a judge's a t t i t u d i n a l 
'span', that i s where no items representing the judge's position are 
presented, then scale values derived from such data approximate Upshaw's 
t-condition i n which the t o t a l span of probable statements are presented; 
however where the extreme of the item population i s excluded there i s a 
displacement of item ratings towards the 'missing' end of the continuum. 
Someapparent inconsistencies i n t h i s study were shown by Manis (1964) 
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to be comprehensible on an assimilation & contrast model when i t i s con-
sidered that Upshaw's subject population was mainly distributed at the 
pro end of the continuum. 
Manis* interpretation was p a r t i a l l y endorsed i n Upshaw's r e -
examination of part of h i s 1962 data (Upshaw 1965) i n which he investigated 
the a f f e c t oh' any f i n a l Thurstone scale of varying judgemental perspectives. 
He shows that vari a t i o n s may be understood i n terms of 'judgemental 
language', and implies the superiority of t h i s interpretation over Manis' 
assimilation-contrast model. Upshaw states that attitude scale values 
can not be sa i d to be invalidated by variat i o n s i n judgemental reference 
scale parameters. 
Robinson (1965) indicates the e f f e c t s of ' l e v e l of information' on 
judgements made i n Thurstone scale construction. The l o g i c a l nature of 
the statements judged i s considered, and the number and nature of the 
judges anchors mentioned. 
Bruvold (1969) reports findings concerning the r e l a t i o n between 
equal appearing i n t e r v a l s and successive i n t e r v a l s s c a l i n g which c o n f l i c t 
with much previous work and theory. He shows a l i n e a r relationship 
between scale values where previous expectations and published evidence 
had indicated a curvilinear relationship. 
Shortly a f t e r Thurstone's work L i k e r t developed 
The Method of Summated Eatings 
A number of statements are dichotomised into favourable and 
unfavourable categories. Judges are then asked to respond to the 
statements on a f i v e category continuum i n which the categories are 
defined a s i 
strongly agree 
agree 
uncertain 
disagree 
strongly disagree 
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These categories are then weighted so that unfavourable statements 
are weighted 0 for strongly agree through to 4 ?OT strongly disagree 
while favourable statements are weighted 4 for strongly agree, etc. I n 
t h i s way subjects with the most favourable responses w i l l achieve the 
highest possible score. 
L i k e r t found that scores based on weights assigned by the naively 
simple i n t e g r a l method correlated 0.99 with scores based on weights 
assigned by the f a r more complex normal deviate system of weighting. 
The normal deviate method requires a normal transformation of the 
cumulative response d i s t r i b u t i o n . These values are made a l l po s i t i v e 
by subtracting the largest negative value from a l l the r e s t and are then 
rounded to the nearest whole number. This procedure i s c a r r i e d out for 
every item i n order to determine the weights to be assigned to each 
s p e c i f i c response to every item separately. For most purposes therefore 
the simple i n t e g r a l method may be employed with no appreciable los s of 
information and a considerable saving i n e f f o r t . 
I n order to s e l e c t the items to be used i n the f i n a l t e s t the 
scores of defined highest and lowest scoring groups are examined (e.g., 
highest and lowest scoring q u a r t i l e s ) . These groups' responses to each 
item are examined by some form of item analysis and those items shown.,to 
distinguish s i g n i f i c a n t l y between the high and low scoring groups are 
selected. 
I t has been said that a score on a L i k e r t scale has no bearing on a 
subject's true attitude outside some reference group since the meaning of 
the 'uncertain' category i s not assumed by L i k e r t to be of zero valence 
as i n Thurstone's work. However, as a means of distinguishing between 
two groups or of measuring change i t i s considered invaluable; though 
t h i s might indeed be s a i d for any s i m i l a r category technique. 
Edwards & Kenney (1946) examine the evidence available on the 
influence of judges' attitudes on Thurstone scal i n g , r e l a t i v e t e s t - r e t e s t 
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r e l i a b i l i t i e s of the two methods, r e l a t i v e ease of construction, and the 
usefulness of a judging group i n scale construction. With reservations 
they conclude that the L i k e r t method would seem l e s s tedious and more 
r e l i a b l e than Thurstone 1s, judges' attitudes have no e f f e c t on f i n a l scale 
values, and a judging group i s unnecessary. 
Barclay & Weaver (19^2) c a r r i e d out a quantitative analysis of some 
of Edwards and Kenney's conclusions and showed them to be stibstantially 
correct. 
Guttman's scalogram analysis 
I n the methods so f a r described there i s no attempt to v e r i f y the 
unidimensionality of items o r i g i n a l l y examined or those f i n a l l y chosen. 
The consequence of t h i s i s to allow items into the f i n a l t e s t , whose 
scale values e x i s t on an e n t i r e l y different dimension from that of the 
majority of the items. Thus a c e r t a i n quantitative response to item A 
on dimension X might mean something quite different from the same 
quantitative response to item B on dimension Y. I f a set of items can be 
shown to e x i s t on different dimensions then i n Guttman's terms they are 
not scaleable. Guttman's method gives a figure descriptive of the degree 
to which a subject's responses are exactly reproducable from h i s scale 
score. A c o e f f i c i e n t of reproducability of above 0.85 or 0.9 means that 
the t e s t i s good on Guttman's c r i t e r i o n . 
Consider a number of statements A^Z. I n a unidimensional scale 
a subject scoring p o s i t i v e l y on item A w i l l score at l e a s t as well and 
no worse on items B-Z while a positive score on item K w i l l mean worse 
scores on items L-Z, etc. The degree to which a t e s t conforms to t h i s 
model i s Guttman's c o e f f i c i e n t of reproducability. A c e r t a i n score on 
any item should convey some information about the subject's scores on the 
other items. 
The importance of Guttman's techniques i s the recognition of the 
concept of non-unidimensionality i n t e s t s . However i t i s not s t r i c t l y 
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speaking a method for s c a l i n g t e s t items, nor does i t provide means for 
se l e c t i n g items to be included i n a t e s t . Edwards & K i l p a t r i c k (1948) 
attempted to account for these f a i l u r e s by combining Thurstone, L i k e r t 
and Guttman techniques i n 
The scale discrimination technique 
Scale values are calculated as i n the method of equal appearing 
i n t e r v a l s . The 50$ of items with the largest i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges are 
eliminated from the t e s t . P h i - c o e f f i c i e n t s are calculated for each 
statement from the scores of defined high and low scoring groups above 
and below a defined neutral score. Statements are then selected from 
each i n t e r v a l or f r a c t i o n a l scale i n t e r v a l of the Thurstone scale values 
on the basis of the highest p h i - c o e f f i c i e n t s . Edwards and K i l p a t r i c k 
divided t h e i r s i x category Thurstone scale scores into h a l f scale 
i n t e r v a l s and from each of the seven h a l f categories containing scores 
they selected the four items with the highest p h i - c o e f f i c i e n t s . These 
28 items were then ranked i n order of t h e i r Thurstone scale values and 
were divided into p a r a l l e l versions of 14 statements each by taking 
alternate items. These versious were then applied to a fresh group of 
subjects who were instructed to express t h e i r agreement or disagreement 
to them on a s i x category defined scale and Guttman c o e f f i c i e n t s of 
reproducability calculated. Both of these were above 0.85 i n t h e i r study. 
No comparative work appears to have been done on the scale 
discrimination technique. 
Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l 
Although t h i s i s not s t r i c t l y an attitude assessment technique, i t 
i s based on methods s i m i l a r to those described above and i n c e r t a i n 
circumstances lends i t s e l f to ready adaptation to the problems of 
attitude assessment. Osgood Suci & Tannenbaum (1952) set out to 
e s t a b l i s h some quantitive measure of meaning. Their intention was to 
produce a form of 'controlled association and scaling' procedure. A 
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subject i s given a concept to evaluate on a number of s c a l e s . The scales 
consist of p a i r s of bipolar adjectives, i . e . , opposite i n meaning, placed 
at either extreme of 5 or 7 category response formats. The subject i s 
required to indicate the i n t e n s i t y and direction ( i f any) of the concept's 
association with each s c a l e . Thus i f the concept i s c l o s e l y related to 
the meaning of one of the adjective p a i r , the subject marks that extreme 
category. I f the scale i s meaningless or i r r e l e v a n t to the concept, 
or i f the concept can be said to possess none of the a t t r i b u t e s s p e c i f i e d 
by the scale then the subject marks the centre category, etc. This i s 
i n contrast to free association i n which a subject responds with a l l the 
related words that spring to mind when the stimulus i s presented. I n 
free association there i s no apparently v a l i d measure of meaning since 
without some form of semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n there are no precise cues 
as to the q u a l i t a t i v e and quantitative connotative meanings of the 
responses. Semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n provides s p e c i f i c responses to which 
the subject may be presumed to respond p o s i t i v e l y i f the scale 
constitutes a natural response to the stimulus concept and vice versa, 
and the i n t e n s i t y of the response may be assumed to represent some 
measure of the probability of t h i s response being e l l i c i t e d i n free 
association. 
The use of bipolar scales stems i n Osgood et a l ' s work from the 
studies of Karwoski, Odbert and others from 1954-1944 on synesthesia 
and s o c i a l stereotypy. 
Osgood's f i r s t study i n Measurement of Meaning (1957) was designed 
to examine the dimensionality of the semantic space, i . e . , the nature of 
the coordinates against which an object may be plotted i n defining i t s 
meaning and d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g i t from other objects. To do t h i s a large 
number of bipolar adjective p a i r s was constructed i n an attempt to 
represent a l l possible shades of meaning. Factor analysis on the r e s u l t s 
for 100 subjects evaluating 20 concepts on 50 scales i s o l a t e d four factors:; 
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rotated into simple structure maintaining orthogonality. The l a s t factor 
extracted accounted for only 1.5$ of the t o t a l variance, hence no more 
factors were extracted a f t e r t h i s and the l a s t factor was ignored. The 
three dominant factors were labeled 'evaluative', 'potency' and ' a c t i v i t y ' 
from the most highly loaded adjective pairs on each of the factors. To 
some extent Osgood confesses that the sampling methods used for concepts 
and scales did not produce unbiased items. However, s i m i l a r r e s u l t s 
were found using a s p e c i f i c factor a n a l y s i s method (D-factorisation) 
designed to eliminate the dependance on concepts to be evaluated, which 
i n themselves might be biased as a sample. Further studies duplicated 
these r e s u l t s when more representative samples of scales were used 
(Thesaurus analysis i n above), s p e c i a l i s e d concepts were evaluated 
(using sonar s i g n a l s ) , and s p e c i a l i s e d material was responded to by 
naive subjects. The r e s u l t of these studies was the delimitation of the 
three primary factors used i n defining semantic space, evaluative, potency, 
and a c t i v i t y . Only a f t e r t h i s work was i t possible to construct a 
semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l {amm d i f f ) s c ale. 
The object of the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l i s to determine the 
meaning of a concept i n terms of i t s valence on each of the orthogonal 
factors defining the semantic space, and hence i t s 'position' i n that 
semantic space, for a selected subject or group. Consider a group of 
subjects who consistently consider a concept good, strong and active; 
these must represent a population considerably different from one which 
considers the same concept bad, weak and i n a c t i v e . Of equal importance 
i s the r e l a t i v e configurations of constellations of concepts. A group 
which consistently considers 'wife' and 'mother' as being very close i n 
meaning must represent something different from one^consistently places 
them i n diametrically opposite quadrants of the semantic space. 
To construct a semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l scale to examine a defined 
set of groups of subjects, f i r s t l y gather together a set of concepts 
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to be evaluated taking care that they are such that there w i l l be a f a i r 
degree of disagreement between the groups to be examined as to t h e i r 
meaning, while they remain f a m i l i a r and unambiguous to the subjects 
individually, f h i s process may involve s e l e c t i v e sampling, but Osgood 
stres s e s the value of discernment and good judgement, fhe choice of 
scales against which the concepts are to be judged i s f a r l e s s haphazard, 
since Osgood et a l ' s work indicates those scales which are highly loaded. 
I t i s only necessary to s e l e c t a number of highly s p e c i f i c a l l y loaded 
scales to represent each dimension of the defined semantic space. I t 
would be unsatisfactory to select only the most highly loaded scale for 
each factor since they are a l l poluted to some extent. By selec t i n g a 
sample of scales to represent each i t i s possible to sum for each factor 
and thus gain a reasonably unpoluted estimate. 
Considerations i n s e l e c t i n g scales are that they must be relevant 
and meaningful to the concepts to be examined. This may involve 
s e l e c t i n g a dimensional factor other than the three dominant ones, for 
which factor loadings for an unbiased population are rather small, but 
which nevertheless gain meaning i n a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n . 
To administer the sementic d i f f e r e n t i a l , each of the concepts i s 
paired i n some form of presentation with each of the s c a l e s . A subject 
i s asked to indicate by placing a mark i n one of the f i v e or seven 
categories of each scale what the concept 'means' to him. I f the concept 
i s c l o s e l y related to the adjective at one end of the scale, then the 
subject must place a mark i n that extreme category. I f the concept i s 
neutral or unrelated to the defining adjectives they must mark the 
middle category, e t c . 
The responses are i n t e g r a l l y weighted, e.g., from 0 to 6 or from 
-3 to +3 for a seven point scale, and the resul t i n g data summed over 
scales for each factor. The mean weighted response f o r concept C on 
factor P_ represents one coordinate of C i n the semantic space defined 
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"by factors ... F j ... F^. Analysis may be c a r r i e d out by vector 
geometry to e s t a b l i s h the significance of the various points i n the 
semantic space a l l o t t e d the concepts, and i f no more than three factors 
are used i t i s a simple matter to construct a 'three dimensional' graph 
of the r e l a t i v e positions of the concepts. 
An early published study s i m i l a r to semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n by 
Jones and Thurstone (1955) examined a number of words and phrases on a 
single 9 category response continuum of 'greatest l i k e ' through 'neither 
l i k e nor d i s l i k e ' to 'greatest d i s l i k e ' . They demonstrated the generally 
normal d i s t r i b u t i o n of the majority of the items using Thurstone's 
successive i n t e r v a l s method. However, while most of the dis t r i b u t i o n s 
were normal some exhibited severe skew within the centre range of the 
continuum (skew at the extremes i s predictable), and others exhibited 
bimodality. This has a bearing on Thurstone's 'ambiguity' c r i t e r i o n i n 
equal appearing i n t e r v a l s . 
While Jones and Thurstone's paper was limited i n only examining one 
dimension of meaning, i t s lack of recognition i n the subsequent \<rorks of 
Osgood, etc., does not appear merited. 
I n analysing concept c l u s t e r s within the semantic space, Osgood 
and L u r i a (1954) r e l i e d on v i s u a l inspection to a great extent, and 
expressed regret that no adequate mathematical procedure was then 
forthcoming. Hofman (19<$7) provides a technique for determining the 
significance of the difference between the positions of concepts and 
concept c l u s t e r s within the semantic space. This analysis i s only 
applicable to the analysis of raw l i n e a r distances between points i n the 
H-dimensional semantic space, and i s not applicable to the analysis of 
s c a l a r quantities; i t i s thus cumbersome and wasteful of information, 
rather l i k e carrying out a number of t - t e s t s on data arranged for ana l y s i s 
of variance. 
The application of semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n to attitude s c a l i n g i s 
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treated i n Brinton (1961). Brinton s e l e c t s those assessment scales from 
an application of the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l on which s i g n i f i c a n t 
differences between defined high and low scoring groups for the items 
assessed are found. He showed a high Guttman c o e f f i c i e n t of reproduca-
b i l i t y for a scale thus derived. Brinton suggests that a generalised 
attitude scale could be constructed by s e l e c t i n g only highly evaluative 
adjective p a i r s i n t h i s way. 
Another application by Barclay (1964) simply sums subjects' responses 
over a l l the scales i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r factor loadings. This r e j e c t s 
the very concept of semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and can hardly be considered 
a true application of the method. 
Hudson (1967) approximates f a r more c l o s e l y Osgood's o r i g i n a l work 
by examining the r e l a t i v e use of evaluative terms by a r t s and science 
biased groups of boys. His f i n a l data were i n the form of graphical 
representations of the s i g n i f i c a n t l y associated c l u s t e r s for the two 
groups. Hudson suggests the comparison of individual r e s u l t s with 
c l u s t e r s such as these as a basis of some form of index of aptitude for 
the occupational biases of the groups t y p i f i e d by those c l u s t e r s . I t 
i s but a small step from an occupational index to one of attitude. 
Questionnaire methodology cannot s t r i c t l y be said to f a l l within the 
range of category s c a l i n g procedures, however where closed ended response 
formats are presented s i m i l a r influences may be assumed to act. Also 
the lack of standard methodology often leads to the unintentional but 
misleading misuse of techniques of construction and a n a l y s i s . 
Adapting A. 1. Oppenheim's (1966) summary of the processes involved 
i n Questionnaire methodology, the following phases must commonly be gone 
through i n the construction and application of a questionnaires 
1. E s t a b l i s h the aims of the study and where applicable state the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
2. Review l i t e r a t u r e , enter into discussions with knowledgeable 
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and interested p a r t i e s . Where applicable, state further hypotheses and 
r e j e c t redundant ones. 
3. State hypotheses from above i n operationally testable terms, 
considering step 8 below. 
4» S e l e c t , adapt or design techniques to examine the above operational 
hypotheses. Specify sample to be studied. 
5. P i l o t study. 
6. Revision of design i n l i g h t of the p i l o t study, (returning to 
step 4 i f necessary). 
7. ¥hen instrument i s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y refined, carry out the 
necessary f i e l d work and data c o l l e c t i o n . 
8. Data processing and a n a l y s i s . This should be so designed from 
the outset that a l l the hypotheses are i m p l i c i t l y tested i n the a n a l y s i s . 
9. Write up study, drawing conclusions d i r e c t l y from the data 
and comparing with other studies. 
f h i s account i s obviously quite f l e x i b l e , and represents to some 
extent experimental methodology i n general, apart from the design of 
parametric studies, i n which no hypotheses are stated (though they may 
be implied), and an eff o r t i s made simply to describe without forcing the 
data to limited conclusions. 
An e s s e n t i a l part of questionnaire methodology i s the form of the 
statement or question put to a subject. Considerations i n t h i s a r e t -
a) Logical form of the question must be c l e a r and comprehensible. 
b) Wording of questionnaire must not imply consistent bias to one 
point of view. 
c) Form of presentation of question must be constant for a l l 
subjects. 
d) Permitted responses must bear a complete relationship to 
question asked. 
Questionnaire methodology borders on the realm of a r t i s t i c 
c r e a t i v i t y , and any further discussion w i l l be l e f t to the following 
commentary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
C r i t i c i s m s of category s c a l i n g procedures 
The most d i r e c t evidence against category s c a l i n g procedures concerns 
the phenomenon variously referred to as response set, Mas or s t y l e . 
This i s a tendency to produce stereotyped responses. Where subjects are 
not required to respond within defined categories, but must indicate 
a position within a homogeneous response continuum, response set may be 
governed by Gestalt. Thus c e r t a i n parts of the response continuum may be 
more e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e even though t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s are specified by 
ex t r i n s i c q u a l i t i e s of the response situ a t i o n . Taves (1941) showed that 
dots arranged i n an i d e n t i f i a b l e pattern (a c i r c l e ) were consistently 
judged l e s s numerous than the same number arranged randomly. By varying 
the relationship between figure and ground, Bevan, Maier & Helson (1963) 
found quite divergent estimates of a constant number of beans i n varying 
sized j a r s . A s i m i l a r effect was found by Bevan & Turner (1964) varying 
the s i z e of the 'frame' around random arrangements of dots. 
Granberg & Aboud (19&9) confirmed the conclusions of Mokre (19 2 7)» 
demonstrating a l i n e a r relationship between judgements of v i s u a l 
numerousness and v i s u a l density. However, they f a i l e d to control order 
e f f e c t s i n t h e i r study, and i n doing so demonstrated the e f f e c t s of 
order on such responses. 
The most important form of response set, for the purposes of t h i s 
paper, concerns response behaviour to a categorised response continuum. 
However, the w r i t e r could find few d i r e c t references to such work. 
Mathews (19 29)» examined responses to a Likert-type format, where f i v e 
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responses were each defined by verbal terms, ( d i s l i k e very much, d i s l i k e , 
i n d i f f e r e n t , e t c . ) , and found a s i g n i f i c a n t discrepancy i n responses 
when the order of presentation of the response categories was reversed 
('like' on the l e f t or on the right)and the s h i f t was greatest where 
subjects had l e a s t pronounced views. This suggested a stereotyped response 
towards a ce r t a i n end of the response continuum r e l a t i v e to the subject 
(possibly 'handedness'). 
P h i l i p (1947) examined an 11 category Thurstone-type s c a l e , and 
found variations i n s c a t t e r between subjects, and ' f o c i ' where 
individual subjects tend to mass responses. 
Many more studies have treated dichotomous responses such as yes-no, 
agree-disagree, e t c . , or simply s e r i e s of items of which only those which 
a subject considers 'correct' or 'agrees with' etc., have to be checked 
(Bennet, Seashore & Wesman 1947j Humm & V/adsworth 1943 > Lorge 1937 > Rubin 
1940, Vernon 1949)• According to Cronbach (1950) these generally demon-
str a t e problem solving methodology s e t s , which may influence any derived 
scores. Cronbach concludes that forced-choice or paired comparison 
methods should be used wherever possible, and where i t i s not possible 
an attempt should be made to induce the same set i n a l l subjects and a 
f i n a l response set score derived to id e n t i f y any possibly i n v a l i d 
r e s u l t s . 
Rorer (19^5) reviewed the l i t e r a t u r e on the topic and concluded 
that response set was at best a minimal a r t e f a c t . Rundquist (I966) 
challenged Horer's conclusions and indicated an item-response model 
including response set which may aid i n determining an index of b i a s . 
This study shows that responses are affected by the form of a statement; 
thus a negatively stated statement i s l i k e l y to e l i c i t a different 
response than the same statement put p o s i t i v e l y . He also showed 
d i f f e r i n g response c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to items with different contents, 
demonstrating the d i f f i c u l t i e s of comparing scales with different 
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contents. 
Das & Dutta (19&9) examined Soueif's Personal Friend Check L i s t , i n 
which set i s equated with response r i g i d i t y , and showed a quadratic 
relationship "between age and r i g i d i t y with a mininram at about 24 years. 
They also showed a positive c o r r e l a t i o n with r e l i g i o s i t y and hypnotic 
suggestion, and a negative correlation with i n t e l l i g e n c e . 
F i n a l l y , we consider the e f f e c t s of question order. Standardised 
t e s t s have a constant order of presentation of questions. I t i s 
accepted that t h i s order was the one with which the test/standardised, 
and thus any ef f e c t s of order are i n t e g r a l components of any f i n a l score 
and are thus i r r e l e v a n t . Granberg and Aboud (1969 above), found a 
si g n i f i c a n t order e f f e c t i n t h e i r perceptual study which while i t did 
not appear to aff e c t t h e i r f i n a l r e s u l t s , nevertheless exhibited wide 
var i a t i o n s . 
The popular b e l i e f i n attitude survey methodology i s that order i s 
quite i r r e l e v a n t , but the writer has been unable to find published 
evidence to j u s t i f y t h i s . Nor, unfortunately, has he found published 
evidence to the contrary. However, from pure psychophysics there i s 
much evidence of both spontaneous alternation and rep e t i t i o n . Zwaan 
(I964) has adapted psychophysical methodology to the question of categori-
c a l responses. I n experiments where there were choices of 2, 4 or 6 
responses, he found s i g n i f i c a n t alternation i n the form of a l e s s than 
random rep e t i t i o n of a previous response. These were not ordered 
categories, but were 'absolute 1 choices such as card suites and numbers 
on dice. However Zwaan points to the importance of t h i s finding to . 
question order i n 'psychodiagnosties*, and the paper appears p a r t i c u l a r l y 
pertinent to problems of questionaire design. 
Wagenaar (1968) comes to the opposite conclusion with a 2-choice 
verbal reaction task. These diverse findings serve to demonstrate the 
general confusion i n t h i s f i e l d , where e.g., choice reaction times show 
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d e f i n i t e recency e f f e c t s but unpaced motor tasks mtA/how alternation, 
ii 
and true randomness are seldom found. I t can only be assumed that within 
a t e s t s i t u a t i o n the nature of the task remains constant throughout and 
whatever response bias i s acting acts constantly. 
LaPierre's paper of 1934» though i n some senses methodologically 
naive, raised a s e r i e s of problems which subsequent te s t constructors 
and theoreticians have preferred to ignore, or at l e a s t forget. LaPierre 
showed that verbal statement of policy towards accepting o r i e n t a l s as 
patrons had no r e l a t i o n to actual behaviour i n the s i t u a t i o n s as 
engineered. I n fact whereas a l l but one out of 250 establishments did 
not refuse service, 118 out of 128 of those establishments stated s i x 
months l a t e r i n questionaires that they would not serve o r i e n t a l s 
( i . e . , 92$), and a s i m i l a r percentage of establishments not v i s i t e d 
responded i n the same way. This may be considered an a r t e f a c t of 
s o c i a l response set i n the same way as the psychophysical response sets 
demonstrated above. 
Corey's (1937) masterful summary of the work done t i l l that time, 
stressed the i m p l i c i t assumptions of v a l i d i t y i n scales with no e f f o r t 
at establishing behavioural measures. His study on attitudes to cheating 
showed a consistant near zero c o r r e l a t i o n between attitude and behaviour. 
Tarter (1966) c i t e s further studies to suggest that attitudes are 
s i t u a t i o n a l rather than absolute, insofar as manifest behaviour may be 
observed (lutner, Williams & Yarrow 1952, Mnard 1952, Lohman & E e i t z e s 
1954). 
Tarter (abid) established testable Parsonian hypotheses to account 
for t h i s phenomenon, but h i s experimental r e s u l t s were i n c l u s i v e . 
The implications of these findings are extensive. Contemporary 
defin i t i o n s of attitude centre on the predisposition to act, and are 
thus linked with the prediction of behaviour (see Chapter l ) . I f 
prediction from current attitude measures f a i l s , then e i t h e r the 
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mechanism of prediction or the attitude measures must be at f a u l t . The 
evidence presented above would appear to l a y the blame on inadequate 
measures. 
giTBSTIOIAIRES 
Blankenship (1940a) l i s t e d examples of the use of apparently harm-
l e s s words influencing responses i n questionaires. He shows the influence 
of ascribing a point of view to a nationally known figure, the e f f e c t of 
emotionally toned adjectives, nouns and verbs as apparently harmless 
as 'involve', and the effect of s o c i a l c l a s s - s p e c i f i c words. Where 
emotionally overtoned words are used, there i s invariably a substantial 
change i n the number of endorsements as compared with a s i m i l a r statement 
put 'neutrally'. Where c l a s s - s p e c i f i c words are used, some portions of 
an intended subject population w i l l simply f a i l to understand the 
question. 
The above writer also carried but an extensive examination of the 
r e s u l t s of various wordings of questions using objective and subjective 
questions worded p o s i t i v e l y and negatively, and also positive objective 
questions containing a check l i s t of responses (Blankenship 1940h). 
A l l the actual questions used were current topics. Blankenship 
concluded that of the types of question he used, the most v a l i d was 
the p o s i t i v e l y objectively stated question with a check l i s t answer. 
However, he admits that t h i s only began to approach the problem and 
more work was necessary before an accurate protocol f o r constructing 
questionaire statements could be evolved. 
Further studies by G a n t r i l (1940), Rugg (1941)j Hugg & C a n t r i l 
(1942) and Hyman (1944-1945) merely highlighted,the problems of 
question wording without providing adequate solutions. One answer 
suggested i n several a r t i c l e s of the period was a vocabulary of words, 
etc. i t i s unadvisable to use i n defined si t u a t i o n s . The scale of 
t h i s work would have been formidable and i t does not appear to have 
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achieved f r u i t i o n . However, the recommendations of Rugg & C a n t r i l 
(1942) appear quite constructive. They conclude that the s t a b i l i t y 
of subjects' answers i n the various question wordings i s a function of 
the s t a b i l i t y of h i s frame of reference and normative system. They 
recommend that questionaires should take into account the variations i n 
individuals' normative systems by examining a v a r i e t y of questions on 
the same issue. They also state t h e i r repudiation of Blankenship's 
(1940b) admittedly limited conclusions and suggest the use of a free 
answer question i n some part of a b a l l o t i n order to sample the t o t a l 
population opinion on an i s s u e , and recommend the use of s p l i t b a l l o t 
techniques as a continual assessment of the above. 
I t i s very probable that the growing i n t e r e s t i n semantics leading 
to semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n the following decade superceded the rather 
cumbersome questionaire methodologies suggested i n the early '40s. I t 
i s c e r t a i n that very l i t t l e could have, or indeed has, been added to 
t h i s work since. However, a s l i g h t l y different area of study popular i n 
the mid '50s and undergoing a resurgence of i n t e r e s t since 1962 sheds 
l i g h t on questionaire methodology through a wealth of sociological 
studies of the process of interviewing sumarised by Manning (1967)* 
Interviews are structured on the s o c i a l norms and values of the 
interviewers, i n that s o c i a l - l i n g u i s t i c categories are t a c i t l y assumed 
to represent the actual s i t u a t i o n under consideration. Thus opinion 
i s commonly divided between 'for', 'against' and 'don't know', and 
people f a l l i n g within these groups are assumed to be homogeneous i n t h e i r 
opinions. But s o c i a l c l a s s subsumes various systems of shared meaning, 
s t y l e s of a f f e c t and mood, which d i f f e r e n t i a l l y attribute significance 
to pregnant pauses, r a i s e d eyebrows, etc. By f a i l i n g to account for 
such d i f f e r e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n a l patterning interviewers f a i l to represent 
multiple perspectives on r e a l i t y , and the f u l l range of responses possible 
even from the individual. 
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The interview may be described as a 'two-game situation i n which 
the 'information game' rewards the interviewee by having h i s ideas 
accepted and recorded, and the 'ingratiation game' by gaining the 
interviewer's approval. The 'good' interviewer i s the one who can 
maximise the rewards to the interviewee of the information game. 
Mentioned also by Manning i s the method of participant observation 
which i s useful i n situations where a group might f e e l i t s i n t e g r i t y 
threatened, and react by producing evasive responses and gambits. 
Participant observation i s conceived as a s i t u a t i o n where participant 
observers gather information and l e a r n the language both verbal and 
behavioural of a group. I t cannot lend i t s e l f to large groups and i n 
aoiae respects may s t i l l be subject to the above c r i t i c i s m s . Even the 
observers are subject to the mores and perceptual sets of a p a r t i c u l a r 
s o c i a l and educational background, and during t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n they 
may also cathect some of the values determining both e x p l i c i t l y and 
i m p l i c i t l y a 'threatening s i t u a t i o n ' , and hence find themselves unable 
(or unwilling) to express or even i d e n t i f y c e r t a i n c o n f l i c t s . 
A psychological assessment of the same problem by Cattel & Digman 
(1964) i d e n t i f i e s seven 'perturbing influences' which may confound or 
polute values derived from survey & interview methodologies t -
1) Instrument factors such as number & nature of permitted 
responses, and nature of s t i m u l i , e.g., a l l biased to an extreme or 
mentioning a single emotionally potent group. 
2) Individual factors such as response set, 
3) Stimulus modulation to the subject by d i f f e r e n t i a l presentation 
due to interviewers, t e s t s i t u a t i o n , etc. 
4) Stimulus modulation to the observer. Role e f f e c t s on S due to 
relationship with 0. S i t u a t i o n a l e f f e c t s on O's scoring of S's responses. 
5) General personality differences outside d i r e c t influence on 
perception of stimuli & responses. 
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6) E f f e c t s of inadequate d e f i n i t i o n or variable meaning of item 
content. Also inadequate s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the t e s t s i t u a t i o n and 
inadequate representation of the density of content variables to be 
examined (mainly a mathematical e f f e c t ) . 
7) E f f e c t s of misperception due to Stereotyped perceptual s e t s , 
e.g., s o c i a l stereotypes, private images, c l i c h e s , e tc. 
SEMANTIC BIFFERffiflATIOIT & SEMANTICS 
Considerable work has been done both d i r e c t l y on and concerning 
semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Jones and Thurstone's paper (1955) has 
already been referred to. life; importance was both i n the early date 
of the work and i n the bimodality i t evidenced i n the meaning of ce r t a i n 
items. I t w i l l be noted that t h i s very c h a r a c t e r i s t i c would probably 
have eliminated those items from an equal appearing i n t e r v a l s scheme, 
but the conceptual set of the paper predisposed the acceptance of 
bimodality as manifesting a legitimate response parameter. 
Mordkoff (1963) challenged the basic assumption i n semantic 
d i f f e r e n t i a l that nominally opposite adjectives are functionally 
opposite, and demonstrated the f a l s i t y of t h i s assumption with several 
commonly used adjective p a i r s . This replicated the findings of Ross & 
Levy (I96O) and T e r w i l l i g e r (1962) and unlike those papers i t used a 
method approximating to semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l . 
Using p a i r s of oppositely defined scales rather than single 
'bipolar' scales, Bentler (1969) demonstrated t h i s e f f e c t yet more 
fo r c e f u l l y by showing a near zero correlation between opposite defined 
scales where a high negative correlation was predicted. However, when 
the effec t s of 'acquiescence set' were p a r t i a l l e d out, he found high 
correlations i n the predicted d i r e c t i o n . This was put forward as 
evidence for the assumption of bi p o l a r i t y . Bentler went on to discuss 
the v a l i d i t y of p a r t i a l l i n g out response bias, and suggested that 
combinations of unipolar scales might well be a more poxferful 
41 
instrument than the conventional semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l . 
Ivan Sipos of the Slovak Academy of Sciences has contributed much, 
al b e i t quietly, to the study of semantic content. His work has l i t t l e 
d ireet bearing on semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i t s e l f , but i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
relevant to problems of wording i n surveys generally. 
Sipos & Kolada (1966) present a method for determining the 'entropy' 
or precision of statements or words. The method i s subject to the general 
c r i t i c i s m s of categorical s c a l i n g as presented above, but conceptually 
i t r e f l e c t s Jones & Thurstone's thinking i n t h e i r paper of 1955* Sipos 
(1966) applied t h i s method to de f i n i t e expressions and c l i c h e s , and 
demonstrated sex differences i n the expressed meaning of several s t a t e -
ments. The c r i t i c i s m s of the categorical method used i n the above two 
papers are p a r t l y mitigated i n Sipos (l$6j) * n which he applies the method 
of successive i n t e r v a l s to data gathered on semantic entropy. 
Sipos & Adamica (1967) applied Cohen & Hansel's (1956) concept of 
subjective uncertainty to items selected from Uysenck's MMQ t e s t , and 
exhibited widely varying within-group measures of meaning with adverbs 
and adverbial expressions of time. This would appear to endorse the 
above summarised work on perturbations due to individual differences, 
and c l a s s - s p e c i f i c operational d e f i n i t i o n s . 
The work on semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n complements the rather crude 
studies on question wording, by providing precise p r o f i l e s of meaning 
for question material which had previously been presumed to approximate 
the values as understood by the t e s t constructor. The danger of 
ignoring c l a s s - s p e c i f i c meanings has been more than amply demonstrated. 
Conclusion and rationale behind the present s e r i e s of experiments. 
•Thurstone's LCJ would appear to have been rather too severe i n i t s 
assumptions. I f Hosteller's (1951 a, b & c) arguments were extended 
to s e r i e s i n which a l l items were assumed to have different disoriminal 
dispersions, then the complete lack of a l l but the approximate ordinal 
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s c a l i n g of items would n e c e s s a r i l y ensue, and there i s l i t t l e to suggest 
that t h i s i s not the case i n the overwhelming majority of cases. Of 
course Thurstone's approach has been of great value where i t has been used, 
I merely suggest the assumptions have been unfortunately, a l b e i t 
n e c e s s a r i l y , s t r i c t . 
A rather more i n t e r e s t i n g approach appears to be offered by 
Durbin (1951), Schucker (1959) and S l a t e r (19^5) i n which sets of items 
are ranked rather than pairs discriminated. There are obvious apparent 
advantages i n time saved alone, but the v a l i d i t y of the Law of Comparative 
Judgement might be questioned where three or more items are presented. 
Disregarding for the moment the Law of Comparative Judgement, the present 
study w i l l attempt to investigate some aspects of ranking over paired 
comparisons. 
An attempt w i l l also be made here to examine Upshaw's (1962) work 
using tangible stimuli i n a conventional category s c a l i n g s i t u a t i o n . 
Thus, while disregarding manifestations of s o c i a l perceptual s e t , which 
can only be studied against the background of an established theory of 
attitude, an attempt w i l l be made to discover c e r t a i n purely psycho-
physical response set e f f e c t s which might be assumed to underly a l l 
category s c a l i n g procedures. The data w i l l also serve to show 
relationships between the various methods of item s c a l i n g . 
F i n a l l y the data w i l l also be seen to be applicable to semantic 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and the use of paired comparisons as an alternative 
i n semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i l l be discussed. 
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Chapter 5 
Experiments Carried Oat 
EXPBRIMMT A 
Experiment to examine systematic d i r e c t i o n a l biases i n category sorting, 
and to investigate item variance over categories as an artefact of end 
ef f e c t . 
Apparatus 
The experiment was designed to investigate underlying response sets 
and as such the stimuli used were designed to be manifestly unidimensional 
and e a s i l y quantifiable. The experimental items consisted of 72 biack 
d i s c s drawn on 4M square cards. The discs varied i n s i z e from 4 to 7cm 
diameter. Every card was i d e n t i f i e d to the experimenter only by a 
coding system. The s i z e of each disc could not be p r e c i s e l y controlled 
due to the small differences involved and the inaccuracies of the 
drawing instrument, which had an error of approximately 0.3mm (959* 
confidence l i m i t s ) . However, i t was intended that the mean difference 
between the r a d i i of adjacently s i z e coded cards should be 0.21mm and 
that t h i s should vary between 0.042mm and 0.38mm. Instrument error 
meant that t h i s range would be somewhat larger and would probably r e s u l t 
i n some 12 item p a i r s becoming reversed i n actual s i z e order. This 
represents a rank correlation between actual and intended disc s i z e i n 
the order of 0.9975. 
These items were to be sorted by judges into eleven categories 
represented by eleven boxes i n a single unit some 4* long. The boxes 
were so designed that there was no indication of the number of cards 
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already inserted into any box, and subjects could not change a decision 
once made. 
Exact copies of the largest and smallest d i s c s were placed i n front 
of the extreme category boxes as reference points. This differed from 
the Thurstone technique i n not defining the cent r a l category as 'neutral', 
thus removing the c r i t i c i s m that the response continuum represents two 
continua extending outwards from the centr a l category (MoNemar 1946 and 
Mordkoff 19&3). The L i k e r t method and the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l define 
every point on the response continuum and the present method also 
diverges from t h i s . The i m p l i c i t assumption i n defining every response 
category i s that these de f i n i t i o n s represent equal sized, equally 
spaced di v i s i o n s and that they cover every possible degree of magnitude 
of response. The w r i t e r does not assume t h i s . 
Method 
Forty-two subjects (judges) were used; a l l were student volunteers 
at Durham University. Half sorted the cards with the l a r g e r comparison 
card on t h e i r l e f t and h a l f with i t on t h e i r r i g h t . 
For each subject the cards were thoroughly shuffled and placed i n 
a single p i l e i n a presentation box which hid them from view but 
enabled the subject to remove the top card quite comfortably. The 
subject was then told the nature of the task thuss-
" I n t h i s box (indicate) there are some cards l i k e these ones 
(indicate reference cards i n front of each extreme category box). 
They a l l have black c i r c l e s on them. The c i r c l e s are a l l different 
s i z e s but the biggest (or smallest) i s the same as t h i s one (indicate 
appropriate reference card) and the smallest (or biggest) i s the same 
as t h i s one (indicate other reference card). A l l the other c i r c l e s 
are i n between these twol Now I want you to pick the cards out of the 
box one by one. You j u s t have to f e e l behind and pick off the top one. 
(Demonstrate with blank cards t i l l competent.) Then I want you to 
45 
compare the s i z e of the c i r c l e with the ones you can see here (indicate 
reference cards). I f i t looks the same s i z e as t h i s one (indicate 
either of the reference cards) you put i t i n t h i s "box (indicate appropriate 
extreme box). I f i t looks h a l f way between them you put i t i n here 
(indicate approximately the centre boxes) and so on. Do you understand? 
(pause for questions). 
" A l l the cards are different s i z e s but some of the differences 
are very small. But don't worry i f a f t e r you've done i t you think you 
put a card i n the wrong box, because you most probably didn't. People 
are usually a l o t more accurate than they thinkI Once you've put a card 
i n forget i t , and only judge the card i n your hand with the ones you 
see here ( i n d i c a t e ) . Eemember, we're not probing into your mind or 
anything l i k e that so j u s t take i t easy and take as long as you l i k e . 
Do you understand?" 
Any queries were answered with paraphrases of the above ins t r u c t i o n s . 
Once they indicated they understood the task the subjects were 
allowed to handle the experimental cards. While performing the task 
they were a l l given some random positive reinforcement i n the form of 
occasional favourable comments on t h e i r 'accuracy*. 
I f a subject showed gross errors i n his f i r s t few responses he was 
reinstructed and questioned. Any cards already sorted were replaced 
randomly i n the pack and the subject allowed to continue. I n only two 
cases was t h i s thought necessary. I f a subject persisted i n gross 
sorting abberations he was allowed to f i n i s h the task as above and h i s 
r e s u l t s were surrepticiously discarded. Only four sets of r e s u l t s were 
rejected. 
Results and discussion 
!The raw r e s u l t s may be seen i n fable 1 (see appendix). 
Hypothesising a position e f f e c t , one of two e f f e c t s might be 
observed:-
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1) i f the subjects as a whole tend to sort towards ei t h e r the 
biggest or the smallest comparison card then the responses i n both 
the groups w i l l tend to show the same d i s t r i b u t i o n over categories from 
biggest to smallest. 
2) i f the subjects tend to sort towards a preferred hand then the 
two groups w i l l tend to show the same d i s t r i b u t i o n of responses over 
categories from l e f t to ri g h t i r r e s p e c t i v e of s i z e . 
To detect any possible bias towards a preferred hand the 
di s t r i b u t i o n of responses over categories from biggest to smallest f or 
each subject i n both groups was examined by p a r t i t i o n i n g chi square 
(Graph l ) . This produced 
Source e — df P — Square —- — 
Group sorting with 
largest card on 337.85 200 ^0.000l(z=6) 
the l e f t 
Group sorting with 
largest card on 270.28 200 0.0006 (z=3.3) 
the r i g h t 
Total 611.81 410 <0.0001 (z=6) 
Residual 3.69 10 O.96 
I t was therefore concluded that there was no difference between 
the two groups i n t h e i r sorting of the items over categories from 
biggest to smallest, i . e . , there was no handedness bias. 
To detect any possible s i z e bias the d i s t r i b u t i o n of responses over 
categories from l e f t to ri g h t for each subject i n both groups was 
examinedj-
Graph 1 
D i s t r i b u t i o n o f items over 
c a t e g o r i e s f a r s u b j e c t s s o r t i n g 
w i t h the l a r g e s t card on the r i g h t 
compared w i t h t h a t f o r those s o r t i n g 
w i t h the l a r g e s t card on the l e f t 
i n experiment A. 
Also the o v e r a l l mean d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
oh 2 
4-
H 
4 
I 
l-t 
a r d m i r t x l e ran? 
Graph $ 
D i s t r i b u t i o n o f L i k e r t ' s i t em s e l e c t i o n 
s t a t i s t i c ' t ' . 
T - t e s t f o r the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e between the mean it e m 
category p l a c i n g s o f the items 
i n experiment A, t a k i n g the h i g h e s t 
and lowest 'scoring' q u a r t i l e s u b j e c t s . 
S u b j e c t s 1 scores based on l i k e r t 1 s 
i n t e g r a l w e i g h t i n g of item 
category p l a c i n g s from 0 t o 10. 
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Graph 4 
Item median category p l a c i n g s , Expt A. 
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Source 
Group sorting with 
largest card on 
the l e f t 
Group sorting with 
largest card on 
the right 
Total 
Residual 
I t was therefore concluded that there was a considerable size Mas. 
Handedness bias was therefore ignored and the two groups combined 
for further analysis, -agaiftot--intended- order of siae of the items.-
Prom graph 2, i t can be seen that central items are subject to 
higher interquartile range than extreme ones. This has a bearing on 
the Thurstone and the Edwards and Kilpatrick scaling techniques, to be 
discussed later. 
Graph 3 i s a plot of the s t a t i s t i c ' t 1 used as part of the item 
selection technique i n the Likert Method. This w i l l also be discussed 
later. 
Discussion 
This experiment was necessarily simple because of the large number 
of subjects needed. As a result of i t , more complex experiments were 
carried out and are reported below. The present experiment's bearing 
on the questions i n hand w i l l be l e f t to the f i n a l discussion. 
EXPERIMENT B 
Experiment to examine the effects on a category scale of variations 
i n the distribution of the items presented. 
Apparatus 
Two packs of 4" square cards with open circles inscribed one on each 
card. The circles varied from 5 to 7cm diameter. Unlike Experiment A 
the mean difference between adjacent size-coded items was a constant 
Chi ,„ •" — di Square — 
'337.85 200 
270.28 200 
725.26 410 
117.13 10 
P 
<0.0001 
0.0006 
«0.1 8 (z=9.5) 
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proportional difference of approximately 0.457$ rather than a constant 
size difference. This difference varied between 0.09$ and 0.823$. The 
r e l i a b i l i t y of the f i n a l order of items could not be estimated as i n 
the previous experiment, but i t was probably of the same order. 
The two packs consisted o f j -
74 cards with circles representing the complete range as 
constructed. 
Pg 45 cards distributed as i n table 2. Thus the smallest and the 
central items of Pj were eliminated from Pg. The apparatus was 
otherwise as i n experiment A. 
Method 
Sixteen subjects were used. Both packs were sorted by every 
subject. The packs were not presented i n immediate succession, but two 
additional tasks were interpolated (see experiment C), this causing 
there to be an interval of approximately t h i r t y minutes between the 
administrations of Pj and Pg. 
Table 5 
Division of subjects into groups 
Group for Subjects sorting 
expt B largest card on 
Order of 
Presentation 
l o . of Sroup for 
subjects expt C 
l e f t (L) or on 
right (r) i n 
expt B 
1 2 5 4 
A L P R P-G P2 2 X 
A 1 P I ft P-C P2 2 X 
A L P-G E P r2 2 Y 
A s P I ?-c 1 P r2 2 Y 
B L P2 R P-C P I 2 X 
B E P2 1 P-G P I 2 X 
B L P2 P-C 1 P_ I 2 Y 
B 1 P2 P-G 1 P r I 2 Y 
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The f i r s t and last tasks to be presented are those concerning us i n this 
experiment. The two interpolated tasks are explained i n experiment G. 
The subjects were divided into two groups as i n Table 3. Group A 
sorted Pj f i r s t and group B sorted P2 f i r s t . Half of each group sorted 
the packs with the largest comparison card on their l e f t and half with 
i t on their right. For analysis the direction of sorting was ignored 
since experiment A showed that this had no effect upon the overall 
distribution of items over categories. 
Unlike experiment A the comparison cards shown as defining the 
extreme categories were not exact replicas of the largest and smallest 
experimental circles, but were scaled up to half as big again with the 
proportions of circle diameter to card size the same. 
Apart from emphasising the nature of the scaled up comparison cards 
the instructions and method were as i n experiment A. 
Results and discussion 
The distribution of cards over categories was examined i n AP^  to 
detect any 'handedness' bias. 
Source Chi-square df P 
Subjects sorting ~ 
largest eards 63.6 24 0.001 
on the l e f t 
Subjects sorting 
largest cards 321.73 24 0.001 
on the right 
Total 388.72 56 0.001 
Residual 3.39 8 0.9 
No significant difference was found, and the l e f t and right hand 
sorting groups were combined for further analysis. 
Consider P^  as a combined pack of P? and 29 others, the others 
causing the whole pack to assume a random distribution between biggest 
and smallest. Ideally the distribution of P2 over categories should be 
( 
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Graph 5 
c 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of cards over c a t e g o r i e s f o r 
?2 on i t s f i r s t p r e s e n t a t i o n t o group A, 
w i t h i n P^; and presented on i t s own 
t o group B; i e on i t s f i r s t p r e s e n t a t i o n 
t o both groups. 
substantially the same when presented on i t s own and within P^ . To 
test this the distribution of cards over categories was examined by 
partitioto-ing ehi square. 
F i r s t l y the distribution of Pg presented on i t s own to Group B 
was compared to i t s distribution as part of P^. presented to Group A. 
That i s on i t s f i r s t presentation to both groups. (Graph 5)• 
Source Chi-square Df ? 
Gp A 110.68 42 « 0.001 
Gp B 142.89 42 « 0.001 
Total 274.28 90 <0.l£ 
Eesidual 20.71 6 0.0028 
This analysis suggests that the form of the distribution of the 
items presented has an effect on the overall distribution of items 
over categories. 
fext the distribution of P_ over categories i n both groups was 
compared}- (Graph 6) 
Source Chi-square I J f P 
Gp A 172.1? 70 « 0.001 
Gp B 165.72 70 «0.001 
Total 356.55 150 0.1 9 
Eesidual 18.5 10 0.05 
and the same was done for P2»- (Graph 7*5 
Source Chi-square Df P 
Gp A 84.64 35 < 0.001 
Gp B 80.58 35 < 0.001 
Total 183.37 75 0.1 9 
Eesidual 18.5 5 0.0049 
These two analyses examined the effect on sorting one pack of 
having already sorted the other. That i s i t examined the effects of 
•carryover1 from one pack to the next. 
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Graph 6 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of AP^ and 
BP^ j over c a t e g o r i e s . 
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In order to draw any conclusions from these analysis i t was necessary 
to examine the distribution of the residual probabilities to decide 
whether they represented a random sample from the tota l population of 
possible residual probabilities. M s was done by summing the residual 
chi-squares and df-.s, producing ehi-suuare « 57*3^ df = 21 and p< 0.001. 
The residual chi squares were therefore taken as indicating t r u l y 
significantly different factors. 
( i t w i l l be noted and may be queried that i n the above analysis 
chi-squares from the same source were different with different df.s. 
This was due to the combinations of categories required i n order not 
to have too many low expected frequencies^ I t can be seen that i n a l l 
the cases examined there was a significant difference i n the distributions 
compared. However, the chi-square test i s insensitive to direction of 
difference. The median category placings of the actual test circles 
were therefore examined empirically to determine the direction of any 
shi f t i n median category placing. This analysis assumes that any s h i f t 
i n the distribution of cards over categories w i l l be the result of a 
systematic shi f t i n the median category placings of the cards themselves. 
Table 4 
Group 1st presentation 2nd presentation 
A Pj P2 
B P 2 P I 
( In the analysis to follow the notation w i l l indicate the group 
and the pack considered, without reference to whether that pack was 
the f i r s t or the second presented to a group. APj. w i l l represent 
the median category placings of the circles constituting P^  when P^  
was presented to group A &c. When both P^  & Pg are expressed together 
i t w i l l indicate that only the circles common to both packs are treated. 
Reference to Table 4 w i l l give the missing information.) 
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APj i s taken as the 'ideal' set of median category values for the circles. 
This is basically because was so constructed as to represent as f u l l y 
as possible the t o t a l range of circles between the visible comparison 
cards. Also APj may be taken as being 'uncontaminated' by any outside 
influences not also common to a l l the other distributions. APj w i l l 
be represented by the symbol ' I * . 
BPg i s taken as a contaminated estimate of ? 2, the uncontaminated 
estimate being the distribution of P2 within APj. The contamination of 
BP2 i s taken as being due to the asymetrical distribution of P2 relative 
to Pj. BPg w i l l be represented by 'I+e', where 'e' represents the 
contaminating influence 
BPj i s taken as being equivalent to AP-j. plus a 'carryover' effect 
from BP2 and w i l l be represented by 'I+c'. 
APg i s taken as equivalent to BPg plus a further contaminating 
effect due to 1 carryover' from AP-j. and w i l l be represented by 'I+e+B1. 
To summarises-
API = I 
3P2 = I+e 
BPj = I+a 
AP2 =» I+e+B 
I f these effects may be considered merely additive then i t may be 
seen that:-
e = BP2 - IF ( I ) 
a = BPj - APj ( I I ) 
B = AP2 - BP2 ( i l l ) 
In any case this form of analysis w i l l demonstrate the forms of the 
shifts which produced the significant chi-squares above. 
Consider graphs 7, 8 and 9, corresponding to e, a and B. These 
GraDh 7 
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graphs were constructed by t a k i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the median 
category p l a c i n g s of the items i n d i c a t e d . A p o s i t i v e d i f f e r e n c e i n d i c a t e s 
a s h i f t towards the 'large' end of the response continuum caused by the 
f a c t o r i n d i c a t e d , and conversely a negative d i f f e r e n c e i n d i c a t e s a 
e 
s h i f t towards the 'small' $nd r e l a t i v e t o the baseline value (AP^). 
A c o n j e c t u r a l r e s u l t was t h a t f o r B i n graph 9 which i s taken as 
rep r e s e n t i n g (l=e+3) - ( i + e ) . As s t a t e d t h i s assumes t h a t a l l e f f e c t s 
are a d d i t i v e . However, a case might be made f o r the non-existence o f 
e f f e c t 'e' i n AP 2 as t h i s assumes e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t the subject i s u n f a m i l i a r 
w i t h the general form o f the items and i n APg t h i s i s c l e a r l y not the 
case. A b e t t e r estimate o f B might t h e r e f o r e be (AP 2 - APj^B ^  as i n 
graph 10 which was constructed by p l o t t i n g the median o f the d i f f e r e n c e 
o f the subjects' category p l a c i n g s o f the items i n Pg and P^. ( i t w i l l 
be p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t i c e d t h a t the s h i f t s evidenced i n graph 9 are 
considerably l a r g e r than those i n graphs 7> 8 and 10, suggesting t h a t 
graph 9 might w e l l be a biased estimate.) 
The p a r t i t i o n e d chi-squares above do not t r e a t the s i t u a t i o n 
(AP 2 - APj). I n order t o examine the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the d i f f e r e n c e 
between the subjects' s o r t i n g s o f P^ and Pg i n group A the d i s t r i b u -
t i o n s o f Pg and P 2 w i t h i n P^ f o r every subject i n group A were examined 
by chi-square. 
f a b l e 5 
Subject Chi-square d f P 
I 8.00 6 0.26J. 
2 17.47 5 0.0061 
3 14.21 6 0.03 
4 2.17 6 0.91 
5 2.76 5 0.76 
6 10.07 6 0.13 
1 16.91 6 0.0094 
8 11.91 6 0.059 
T o t a l 85.50 46 <C0.001 
G r a p h 10 
/3 /=AP 2-AP 1 
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Table 5 shows the value o f chi-square f o r each subject i n group A 
and the t o t a l . T his i s taken as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the general t r e n d of the 
s h i f t s e x h i b i t e d i n graph 10 are s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Examining graphs 8 and 9 a d e f i n i t e s i m i l a r i t y may be observed i n 
the general shapes and the p o s i t i o n s of the peaks. This suggests t h a t 
t h e r e was a common element i n the carryover e f f e c t s a and B. The s t r i c t 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s o f Pragnanz, o b j e c t i v e set or c o n t r a s t 
would have p r e d i c t e d t h a t the carryover e f f e c t s appear m i r r o r images o f 
one another. We now hypothesise t h a t the carryover e f f e c t c o n s i s t s 
o f two a d d i t i v e e f f e c t s . The common element we s h a l l c a l l 'C, and t h i s 
w i l l be assumed t o be due t o •experience' o r 1 l e a r n i n g ' . The carryover 
e f f e c t due s p e c i f i c a l l y t o having already s o r t e d AP^ w i l l be c a l l e d 'a' 
and i s e q u i v a l e n t t o an uncontaminated estimate o f a. S i m i l a r l y the 
uncontaminated estimate o f B' w i l l be c a l l e d 'b'. Ve 'may now say t h a t 
the d i f f e r e n c e between the uncontaiminated carryover e f f e c t s i s (b-a) 
which equals (B'- a) => (C+b)-(C+a) - ( b - a ) . Graph 11 represents B'- a. 
Ifo chi-square estimate o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s l i n e can be gained, 
but from the above mentioned p r i n c i p l e s o f Pragnanz, o b j e c t i v e set or 
oontr a s t i t could be hypothesised t h a t w i t h the carryover e f f e c t s being 
m i r r o r images o f one another, the d i f f e r e n c e between should be i n the 
order o f t w i c e the i n d i v i d u a l e f f e c t s . I n order t o t e s t the obtained 
r e s u l t s a crude form o f t r e n d a n a l y s i s was employed by comparing the 
variance o f the data about i ) the p o i n t o f no d i f f e r e n c e , i . e . , the 
l i n e y = 0; and i i ) the f i t t e d l i n e . Doing t h i s the variance r a t i o was 
1.28 w i t h d f j « d f g = 44 and thus p = 0.2. The data were t h e r e f o r e taken 
as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t no unbiased carryover e f f e c t s could be detected, and 
i t was concluded t h a t no conclusions could be drawn concerning d i f f e r e n t i a l 
c arryover e f f e c t s from ? 1 t o P 2 and from P g t o P p and f o r f u r t h e r 
a n a l y s i s a and B' were ignored. 
The next a n a l y s i s concerned the nature o f the common element o f 
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s h i f t . To do t h i s only one case was considered, namely t h a t o f APj and 
BPj, since t h i s provided more i n f o r m a t i o n than the case o f P 2 c o n s i s t i n g 
as i t d i d o f 74 p o i n t s against the 45 of P 2. 
Graphs 12 and 13 are p l o t s o f the I n t e r q u a r t i l e Ranges o f APj and 
BPj r e s p e c t i v e l y . Graph 14 i s a p l o t of the best f i t l i n e s , by eye, o f 
the above two p l o t s . This demonstrates the e f f e c t upon i n t e r q u a r t i l e 
range o f being already f a m i l i a r w i t h the general nature o f the t e s t 
items. 
The w r i t e r suggests t h a t these s h i f t s may be understood i n terms o f 
the b i a s i n g e f f e c t s o f anchoring i n a r e s t r i c t e d response continuum 
such as t h i s . 
Examine the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges i n t h i s experiment 
as compared w i t h t h a t i n experiment A (Graph 2 ) . Let us assume t h a t the 
m o t i v a t i o n a l s t a t e s o f the subjects were e x a c t l y the same i n task AP^ 
and i n experiment A. I n both s i t u a t i o n s i t was the f i r s t time the 
subjects had seen the c i r c l e s i n v o l v e d . The d i f f e r e n c e s i n the tasks 
were thus:-
a) I n experiment A the comparison cards were e x a c t l y r e l a t e d t o 
the items sorted w h i l e i n the present experiment they were o n l y 
•analogous'. 
b) I n experiment A the items were black c i r c l e s w h i l e i n the 
present experiment they were open c i r c l e s . 
c) I n experiment A th e r e was a constant mean si z e d i f f e r e n c e between 
a d j a c e n t l y size-coded c i r c l e s , i n t h i s experiment t h i s was a constant 
mean p r o p o r t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e . 
d) The ranges o f c i r c l e diameters were d i f f e r e n t i n the two 
experiments. With these i n mind l e t us examine the e f f e c t s o f the 
d i f f e r e n c e s . 
F i t t i n g a l i n e t o the item median category p l a c i n g s i n the two 
experiments g i v e s / i n which the present experiment approximates f a r more  
u. lb 
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c l o s e l y t o a s t r a i g h t l i n e . This was p a r t l y the o b j e c t o f the present 
methodology which was designed a f t e r the r e s u l t s o f experiment A had 
been analysed. 
I n m o t i v a t i o n a l l y analogous s i t u a t i o n s the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges appeared r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t , w h i l e a f t e r a s h o r t 
p e r i o d they tended towards s i m i l a r i t y . See graph: 13 and graph 2 . 
I t thus appears t h a t where the comparison cards were d i r e c t l y 
r e l a t e d t o the items presented, the f i r s t t r i a l achieved the 'optimum' 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f items. But where the comparison cards were only 
analogous t o the items presented the r e s u l t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges diverged from the 'optimum'. The 'optimum' here 
simply expresses the f i n a l s t a b l e values. 
The w r i t e r o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g hypotheses t o describe these 
e f f e c t s s -
1) The u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h which a subject r a t e s an o b j e c t i s a 
d i r e c t f u n c t i o n o f t h a t object's p s y c h o l o g i c a l distance from an anchoring 
s t i m u l u s . 
2) Where a subject i s presented w i t h an anchoring stimulus which 
e i t h e r q u a l i t a t i v e l y o r q u a n t i t a t i v e l y does not f a l l near the range o f 
the o b j e c t s t o be r a t e d , t he subject tends to e s t a b l i s h h i s own anchor 
and t o judge r e l a t i v e t o t h a t . 
3) The 'potency'of a s u b j e c t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d anchor decreases as 
the s ubjects' f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the presented 
anchor and the o b j e c t s t o be r a t e d increases. 
The f i r s t hypothesis suggests t h a t the sharp decrease o f 
i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges near the c e n t r e o f the range i n graph 12 i s the 
r e s u l t o f a s u b j e c t i v e anchoring s t i m u l u s , since one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
o f anchoring s t i m u l i i s t h a t they tend t o produce r e l a t i v e l y i n v a r i a b l e 
stereotyped responses i n t h e i r v i c i n i t y (Upshaw 19&2 and 19^5)• 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges i n BP T was s i m i l a r t o 
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t h a t i n experiment A apart from v a r i a t i o n s at the ' l a r g e ' end, which 
suggests t h a t a f t e r a p e r i o d o f time the s o r t i n g s o f the cards i n the 
two d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s achieved a c e r t a i n degree o f mutual 
u n i f o r m i t y . 
Graph 8 shows t h a t about i t e m 54 there was a tendency f o r more 
items t o he massed i n BP^ than i n AP^, and t h i s coincides w i t h the 
d i p i n i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges i n AP^. This i s i n d i c a t e d "by the negative 
slope of the f i t t e d l i n e c r o s s i n g the x - a x i s . (As mentioned above t h i s 
means t h a t the items to the l e f t o f the c r o s s i n g p o i n t w i l l e x h i b i t 
a s h i f t t o the r i g h t w h i l e the items t o the r i g h t w i l l e x h i b i t a s h i f t 
t o the l e f t , thus causing a ' r e l a t i v e ' peak when compared w i t h AP^. 
This may be understood by comparison w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f items 
over categories i n experiment A where i t may be seen t h a t a t the 
extremes of the response continuum, i . e . , close t o the anchoring 
s t i m u l i , the subjects showed a reluctance t o mass items . Thus i n 
APj the subjects were r e l u c t a n t t o concentrate t h e i r responses close 
t o t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e anchoring s t i m u l u s . 
L a s t l y the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges i n BP^ e x h i b i t e d 
a tendency f o r r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e r i n t e r q u a r t i l e ranges a t the l a r g e 
end than t h a t i n experiment A. This was probably due t o the nature of 
the anchoring s t i m u l i provided making i t m a r g i n a l l y more d i f f i c u l t t o 
o r i e n t a t e w i t h the anchoring s t i m u l i than i n experiment A. 
EXPERIMENT 0 
Experiment t o examine the r e l a t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y powers o f p a i r e d 
comparisons and r a n k i n g i n groups of t h r e e 
Apparatus 
25 items each c o n s i s t i n g of two matched sets o f cards. The sets 
o f cards w i l l be c a l l e d the 'R' and 'P-C se t s . The R sets each 
consisted o f t h r e e 4" square cards w i t h an open c i r c l e i n s c r i b e d on 
each card, and each P-C set consisted o f three 4" x 8" cards w i t h two 
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open c i r c l e s i n s c r i b e d s y m e t r i e a l l y on one side of each. The c i r c l e s were 
exact copies of selected c i r c l e s from experiment B and were i d e n t i f i e d 
w i t h the same code. . 
Table S y n d i c a t e s the intended s i z e d i f f e r e n c e o f the p a i r s 
examined i n p r o p o r t i o n a l u n i t s (one p r o p o r t i o n a l u n i t = 0.0914/0» 
These size d i f f e r e n c e s were chosen i n an attempt t o ensure as wide as 
The sets were so constructed t h a t each c i r c l e i n R was e x a c t l y 
d u p l i c a t e d t w i c e i n P-0 such t h a t P-C consisted of the three c o n s t i t u e n t 
p a i r s o f E. Schematically R may be represented by the symbols A, B, C, 
and P-C may be represented by AB, AC, BC. 
Method 
Sets R and P-C were used t o examine s o r t i n g behaviour i n Ranking 
and Paired-comparisons r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
To admin i s t e r the S sets the subjects were t o l d j -
" I ' v e got some sets o f cards here. I'm going t o give you them a 
set a t a time. I want you t o look at the c i r c l e s on the cards and t o 
s o r t them i n t o order o f s i z e . When you've sorted each set I want you t o 
give them back t o me i n a p i l e w i t h the biggest on the top and the smallest 
on the bottom and I ' l l give you the next t o do r i g h t away. Do you 
understand?" Any queries were answered w i t h paraphrases of the above 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . The sorted orders were recorded. 
To administer t he P-C sets the whole pack o f 75 P-C cards was 
placed i n f r o n t o f the subject face up and the subject was t o l d s -
H I n f r o n t o f you are some cards w i t h two c i r c l e s on them. I want 
you t o look at the c i r c l e s c a r e f u l l y and decide which o f them i s bigger. 
I f the c i r c l e on the r i g h t i s bigger I want you t o p i c k up the card 
w i t h o u t t u r n i n g i t and put i t i n a p i l e on the r i g h t . I f the l e f t hand 
c i r c l e i s bigger I want you t o put the card i n a p i l e on the l e f t . When 
you've f i n i s h e d you should f i n i s h up w i t h two p i l e s o f cards w i t h the 
pos s i b l e a range o f d i f f i c u l t y . 
c 
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biggest c i r c l e s on the outside away from you. Do you understand?" 
Any queries were answered w i t h paraphrases o f the above i n s t r u c t i o n s 
and demonstrations w i t h 'dead' cards. The o b j e c t o f the method was t o 
preserve the cards as sorted i n order to determine the judgement of 
each card and the numbers of cards moved t o l e f t and r i g h t . 
Before each subject was t r e a t e d the R sets were s h u f f l e d , and the 
P-C p i l e was sorted and s h u f f l e d to ensure a more or l e s s equal number 
o f o b j e c t i v e l y l a r g e r cards on the l e f t and r i g h t and a d i f f e r e n t 
random order t o each subject. The R sets were a l s o presented i n a 
d i f f e r e n t random order t o each subject. 
H a l f of the subjects were presented w i t h the R sets f i r s t (group X) 
and h a l f w i t h the P-C sets f i r s t (group Y ) , as i n Table 3. A l l of the 
R sets were presented i n succession as were a l l the P-C p a i r cards; and 
the two groups o f sets were presented w i t h only a minute or so between 
them t o prepare the next p r e s e n t a t i o n s . 
Results 
The r e s u l t s may be seen i n Table 6 ( i n the appendix). Each s e c t i o n 
of the t a b l e i s of the forms-
A 
B 
0 1 
and c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e c e l l s , one f o r each p a i r of the set ABC. W i t h i n 
each c e l l are two marks. Each mark may be a ' I ' o r a ' 0 ' . An ' I ' 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t the subject reckoned the c i r c l e designated by the upper 
code d e f i n i n g that c e l l as bigger than the c i r c l e designated by the lower 
code d e f i n i n g the c e l l . The mark on the l e f t o f each c e l l r e f e r s t o the 
subject's choice i n the R s e t , and t h a t on the r i g h t t o h i s choice i n 
the P-C set. Thus the example above represents the f o l l o w i n g 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s s -
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Banking - subject sorted c i r c l e s i n t o order A> C > B, from 
which the i n d i v i d u a l p a i r s may be assumed t o be 
di s c r i m i n a t e d t h u s ; A>B, A >C, G > B. 
Paired Comparisons - Subject d i s c r i m i n a t e d thus; B>A, 
O A , B> C. 
A c o r r e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n s o f a r as i t i s i n the d i r e c t i o n 
intended i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the items i s represented by a ' 0 ' . 
I n order t o analyse these data a measure o f the accuracy i n each 
set was r e q u i r e d . The measure taken was the number of p a i r s i n each 
set c o r r e c t l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d . Thus i n the above example there were two 
c o r r e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i n P-C against one i n R. 
For a n a l y s i s the subjects were d i v i d e d i n t o t h e i r two groups 
X and Y i n order t o examine the e f f e c t s of order o f p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
the s e t s , and each i t e m was examined to discover whether e i t h e r o f the 
methods o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g produced more c o r r e c t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . Thus 
a 2(groups) x 8(subjects per group) x 2 5(items) x 2(sets per item) 
m a t r i x was set up and analysis o f variance done. The r e s u l t s were as 
i n the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e t 
Source Sum of squares m Mean Square 1 i. 
Between Subjects 12.81 
A (groups) 0.10 24 0.0042 0.058 NSD 
Subjects w. Groups 
( e r r o r a) 
12.71 175 0.073 
W i t h i n Subjects 569.14 600 
B (items) 45.04 1 45.04 31.71 0.001 
AB 15.99 24 O.67 0.47 USD 
B x subjects w. groups 
( e r r o r b) 
248.60 175 1.42 
C ( s e t s ) 2.10 1 2.10 8.11 0.01 
AC 0.03 24 0.0013 0.005 NSD 
C x subjects w. groups 
( e r r o r c) 
45.32 175 0.26 
BC 18.18 1 18.18 17.48 0.001 
ABC 11.88 24 0.49 0.48 BSD 
BCx subjects w. groups I 8 I . 9 9 175 1.04 * 
( e r r o r bo) 
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This indicates a) no difference between the two groups of subjects, 
i . e . , the order of presentation has no effect on the overall accuracy 
of discrimination; b) a significant difference in the accuracy with 
which the subjects sorted the items, i . e . , some of the items were more 
d i f f i c u l t to sort or discriminate than others; c) a significant 
difference between the sets. This was the most important finding and 
indicates that the E sets produced signif icantly more correctly 
discriminated pairs (2.0875) than the P-C sets (1.985). d) there was 
a significant sets/items interaction. This was found to be due to a 
significant correlation between the number of correct discriminations in 
R and P-G (r= 0.555, t = 3.2, df = 23, p<0 .007) . 
In order to examine the sensi t iv i ty of item selection by category 
and paired comparison methods, f i r s t l y t-tests were carried out between 
the items of experiment A to decide how many 'easi ly distinguishable 
steps' could be detected in that method, i . e . , to discover those items 
which from these data are a l l easi ly distinguishable from each other 
(at the 5$ l eve l , t-test for related samples). 
Graph 17 represents the number of items from which each item 
(represented in size order on the x-axis) i s not s ignif icantly different. 
From the f i t ted curve i t can be seen that with some degree of r e l i a b i l i t y 
22 items can be selected. This selection was done by dividing the 
number of items from which item X i s deemed signif icantly different 
Y' 
(Y' = fx) by two and selecting item X + ; the same procedure was 
then carried out for this selected item. I t can be seen that on this 
cri terion the distribution of items selected w i l l be uneven over the 
defined stimulus continuum. 
Hext the data i n the present experiment were examined, and the 
distribution of 'correct' and 'incorrect' discriminations on the simple 
paired comparisons method were plotted against the intended size order 
of the smaller of each item pair. By combining these resu l t s , the middle 
Graph 17 
The number of items i n Expt A 
from which each item was not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . 
Data taken from m u l t i p l e 
t - t e s t s f o r correlated means, 
at the 5/» l e v e l of significance 
80. 
approximately three-sevenths of the defined stimulus continuum was 
compared with the two extremes, and a chi-square analysis carried out 
on the numbers of 1 incorrect' responses in these ranges. This 
produced chi-square = 0.853> df = 4» P « 0 .9 . Thus the data exhibited 
no end effect; a result which i s by no means surprising considering the 
method "by which the items were constructed. 
The numbers of 'incorrect' discriminations were then plotted 
against the intended arbitrary proportional unit size differences of 
the pairs (see table 6 ) . A correlation of r = -0.44* P ~ 0 .001, was 
found. The regression of number of incorrect discriminations upon 
proportional unit size difference was found to be Y' = 8.274 - 0.239X, 
from which for Y' «= 4 (p - 0.058 binomial t e s t ) , X = 17.88. low the 
total span of pack P^ from which the item pairs were duplicated, was 
36l proportional units , from which i t may be concluded approximately 20 
items may be selected on the stated cri terion. 
Considering the items selected from the category scaling applica-
tion were from the pooled results of 42 subjects, each of whom had to 
sort some 72 items, the present paired comparison method represents a 
considerable saving in effort , representing as i t does 75 simple 
discriminations by only 16 subjects. I t i s only f a i r to state however, 
that the data in the present experiment could not have been so easi ly 
gained without an accurate knowledge of the order of size of the items. 
Had the tr ip le t ranking data been used instead of the simple 
paired comparisons, or had a larger subject population been used and 
selection made at the 5?b level as in experiment A, then the paired 
comparison method would have enabled the selection of a consi derably 
larger number of items. 
(The t-test item selection technique carried out above was not 
done on the data for experiment B, since for that experiment only the 
results for AP^ could have been used, and thus only eight sets of results 
used, with the consequent loss of precision.) 
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EXPEBIMBre I? 
Experiment to determine the relative temporal advantages of several 
methods of multiple comparison. 
Apparatus 
An electronic timer connected to a 'presentation she l f 1 . A stop 
clock. 200 4" square cards with c i rc l e s of varying diameters inscribed 
one on each card. The cards were a combined pack from experiments C 
and B, and were more or less randomly distributed between the largest 
and the smallest. 
Method 
The cards were thoroughly shuffled and randomly divided thus:-
2 sets of 4 packs of 5 cards 
2 » " 4 ** 9 H 
1 set of 4 packs of 3 cards 
1 » M 4 M n j t» 
1 " " 4 " " 12 " 
One set of packs of 5 cards and one of packs of 9 were used to 
accustom the subject to the method of sorting required. Half the 
subjects were presented with the 5 card packs f i r s t and half with the 
9 card packs. The remaining 5 sets were presented i n a different random 
order to each subject. A l l seven sets were presenteid inquick succession 
with a few minutes rest between each during which the experimenter noted 
results and set up the next set. 
To administer each set the four packs of the set were placed on 
the presentation shelf side by side and the subject was instructed to 
sort each pack in order starting from the l e f t . He was told to take 
the f i r s t pack, place the top card on the table before him, take the 
next card and place i t to the l e f t or right of the f i r s t as he judged 
the c i rc l e on i t bigger or smaller than that on the f i r s t . He was to 
proceed with each -succeeding card in a similar fashion placing them 
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among those already down, to f inish with a line of cards with c irc les of 
increasing s ize . At any time he could alter the order and when sat is f ied 
he was to gather up the cards with the largest on top, replace i t on the 
shelf whence i t came and move immediately to the next pack. 
The sequence of actions carried out by the subject was as follows!-
(3 
® (D (S> (D ® 
0 (D 
1. Subject reaches out to select f i r s t pack. 
2. Subject takes pack and brings i t to sorting area. 
3. Subject sorts pack, 
4« Subject gathers up pack and replaces i t . 
5» Subject moves to next pack. 
The presentation shelf was f i t ted with a microswitch beneath each 
pack. The f i r s t and last switches were used to record the time from the 
replacing of the f i r s t to the replacing of the la s t packs. Thus three 
complete cycles of events 5-2-3-4 were recorded automatically ( T ) . 
Meanwhile the experimenter used a stop clock to record the total time 
for a l l four events 4 ( t ) . 
Also recorded for each sorted pack was a measure of the correlation 
• 2 
between the true and the sorted orders in the form of ^ d from 
Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation. 
For each set of sortings the subject stood facing a bench 2» wide, 
6' long and 3' high. On the opposite side of the bench was the 
presentation shelf. The area between him and the presentation shelf was 
the sorting area. 
For subjects A and B, t was ignored due to faulty apparatus. For 
subjects C - F , t was corrected by a factor of 1.0123, and for subjects 
G-J by a factor 0.9958, due to variations in the timing clocks used. 
Results 
In fable 7 are recorded the raw results (see appendix). 
P ir s t ly , to see i f there was any significant difference in the 
mean time to sort a pair between the methods of sorting, the raw results 
were converted thuss-
1' t 
•x — -r (x correction factor) 
Mean time per pair = — - _ , 
N - H 
2 
T/3 = the mean time spent on each of the las t three packs 
t/4 = the mean time to pick up and replace a pack 
(N - U)/2 = the number of pairs that may be made from the N cards 
in each pack. 
This gave the following results 
Table 8 
Subject Sorting mode (pack size) H. 
5 5 7 9 12 
A 4.1729 2.7374 2.856 1.8039 2.1463 
B 1.2597 1.088 0.7954 0.559 0.6015 
C 2.0212 1.2829 1.0134 I.0742 0.8435 
D 1.5876 0.9367 0.682 O.6561 0.8148 
E 5.78 1.7475 1.5245 1.6819 1.2585 
P 1.7766 1.4449 1.1876 1.1147 0.8876 
S 1.5946 0.7369 0.5472 0.5357 0.5863 
H 2.0786 1.9426 I.0258 0.9533 0.7038 
I 1.9875 1.4169 1.5012 I.6386 2.1728 
J 4.IO46 3.328 3.1016 2.0013 1.7567 
Mean time to sort a pair from the different 
sorting modes, (sees.) 
Table 9 
3 5 7 9 12 
2.6363 1.6662 1.4233 1.2019 1.1752 
Overall mean time per pair for each sorting mode 
For subjects A and B,t was estimated from the mean t of the 
remaining 8 subjects despite the fact that analysis of variance showed 
significant difference in t between subjectsj-
Mean square DF F P 
sorting modes 1462.4 4 99.568 « 0.001 
subjects 79.67 7 5.425 0.001 
residual 14.69 28 
Subjects Sorting Modes 
b 
d 
f 
S 
h 
i 
3 5 7 9 12 
0 0 7 2 .1 _ 
0 0 20.3 3.3 -0 0 26.5 3.3 -0 0 0 0 -
75 _ 7 9.75 4.84 
0 - 13.8 12.9 6.87 0 - 0 19 6.87 0 - 0 0 8.22 
0 19 7.02 3.31 1.4 
0 9.75 20.28 3.31 2.78 
0 0 0 6.56 5.52 
0 0 0 12.89 10.88 
75 19 7.02 3.31 5.52 
75 36 20.28 6.56 8.22 
0 0 13.78 15.97 10.88 
0 0 0 15.97 16.08 
0 19 7.02 3.31 1.4 
0 19 0 3.31 1.4 
0 0 0 0 5.52 
0 0 0 0 6.87 
0 19 7.02 3.31 1.4 
0 19 13.78 3.31 2.78 
0 0 0 21.97 4-15 
0 0 0 24.89 5.52 
0 19 7.02 3.31 2.78 
0 0 7.02 6.56 2.78 
0 0 20.28 9.75 10.88 
0 0 32.53 0 14.79 
75 0 7.02 3.31 1.4 
0 0 13.78 3.31 2.78 
0 0 29.56 3.31 5.52 
0 0 0 14.44 21.97 
75 19 13.78 3.31 2.78 
0 19 20.28 6.56 2.78 
0 0 0 6.56 6.87 
0 0 0 19.0 8.22 
0 51 7.02 6.56 1.4 
0 0 7.02 0 5.52 
0 0 7.02 0 6.87 
0 0 20.28 0 10.22 
Overall means 9*375 8.367 9.025 6.372 6.309 
Table 10 
Sorting modes against random (unexplained) variance ( i - r ) x 100 
for each pack in each sorting mode* 
A two way analysis of variance on Table 8 producedi-
Mean square DP F p 
subjects 4.20 9 237.63 «0.001 
sorting modes 3*76 4 212.71 « 0 . 0 0 1 
residual 0.018 % 
Thus subjects d i f f er signif icantly intheir mean sorting times and 
the difference in the sorting mode Bean sorting times i s s ignif icant. 
A form of trend analysis on the sorting mode mean sorting times 
produced z = 3.10 suggesting the downward trend with increasing 1 was 
s ignif icant. 
In order to assess the relative accuracy of the different sorting 
modes the rank correlation of each subject's sortings was calculated 
from 2. d and the measure ( I - r ) x 100 was taken as the percentage 
of the total variance involved in the correlation attributable to random 
factors. 
This produced table 16. 
Analysis of variance on these data produced!-
Mean Square DP P P 
Subjects 329.05 7 1.80 0.0955 
Modes 67.95 4 0.37 MSB 
Interaction 177.17 28 0.97 ' HSB 
Residual 182.86 120 
Thus there was no difference in the accuracy with which the items were 
sorted in the difference modes, and only 'subjects' approached 
significance. 
The overall percentage of random error variance in the different 
sorting modes suggested decreasing error variance with increasing 1. 
A form of trend analysis was carried out on the results but no trend 
07. 
was found (z = 0.582). 
The results were further examined for the relationship "between 
2 
( i - r ) and mean sorting time per pair . For each sorting mode each 
subject's mean sorting time per pair was correlated with the total error 
variance over the four packs sorted. These were then averaged using 
Fisher's z to produce r = -0.328. To find the significance of th is r 
the t ratios were computed for the individual correlations and the 
probabilities were summed under the directional hypothesis of a positive 
true correlation. This produced p - 0.4* I t was therefore concluded 
that time spent on discriminating did not correlate with accuracy of 
discrimination. 
CHAPTER 6 
Discussion 
The present studies exhibited no evidence of a pure'handedness' 
bias in the category scaling experiments, which confl icts with Matthews' 
(1929) finding. The most significant obvious bias demonstrated was a 
's ize' bias in which items tended to be massed at the 'large' end of the 
attenuated response continuum. The response continuum was so defined 
as to represent the total range of the,items presented, and thus a 
significant underlying tendency was again demonstrated. The primary 
result of this was the non-linear distribution of item medim category 
placings, the logarithmic relationship of psychophysics, which may be 
understood in terms of smaller proportional differences (approaching the 
least noticeable difference) with unit increase in s ize . Thus, while 
item median category placings show a powerful manifestation of end effect , 
when related to the defined response continuum the results are logical 
and comprehensible. However, when i t comes to combining scales or scale 
items whose response continua cannot be shown to be coincident, problems 
of homogeneity may be met with. Ideally items or scales to be combined 
into a single scale should exhibit ranges of possible responses such 
that no attenuation effects should be obvious within the total range 
covered. Any item which shows manifest attenuation effects within the 
total range should not be accepted without some weighting of the 
attenuated responses such as the normal transformation described else-
where. However, this transformation has the disadvantage of not coping 
rationally with the extreme category of any continuum, which i s the 
precise area where i t i s potentially of the greatest value. 
A corollary of the effects of attenuation i s the invalidity of the 
assumption of normal distribution of responses over categories outside 
the middle range of any attenuated response continuum. The adverse 
tendency of the Likert t-test item selection technique in graph 3 to 
select only middle range items i s most probably a direct result of th is ; 
as also i s the biasing of any scale derived from the scale discrimination 
technique of Edwards and Kilpatrick towards the extremes, since this 
method involves the elimination of the 50/o of items with the greatest 
interquartile ranges, which from graphs 2, 12 and 13 can be seen to be 
concentrated within the midrange. The Likert method w i l l produce a 
scale relat ively less sensitive to subject scale values towards the 
extremes, while the Edwards and Kilpatrick method w i l l be less sensitive 
to midrange subject scale values. The advantages of one technique over 
the other are d i f f i c u l t to establish, and may well depend on the pucpose 
to which any derived scale i s to be put. Of course the ideal scale would 
be equally sensitive to the whole subject scale value range, but in the 
present study this ideal appears to be elusive. 
Thurstone selected items on the basis of item scale values with 
secondary consideration being given to item interquartile range. This 
would appear to be rather better than either the Likert or the Edwards & 
Kilpatrick methods, in that i t i s designed to produce an even density of 
items over the range considered. However, i f the items are actually 
distributed objectively as in experiments A or B above, then in the 
f i r s t case, from graph 16 i t w i l l be seen that item objective scale 
value of the constructed scale w i l l tend to be distributed approximately 
exponentially; while in the second case there w i l l be under-
representation of the lowest item objective scale values, which w i l l 
in fact have the opposite effect to the former. Thurstone's second 
choice criterion i s suspect on the grounds of the great var iabi l i ty in 
both item median category placings and item interquartile range over 
categories. Where there i s variabi l i ty of this order i n items of th is 
kind, items of a more obtuse nature may well have any intr ins ic 
invariabi l i ty masked, and choice w i l l be l i t t l e better than random about 
each item scale value range. However, the nature of the items and the 
s ta t i s t i c s derived j u s t i f y the use of interquartile range, though under 
the circumstances, and notwithstanding the above remarks on the 
inval idity of the assumption of normal distributions in the forms of 
data studied here, means and standard deviations would represent 
considerably more stable s ta t i s t i c s on which to base these choices. 
So far we have considered the effects of response continuum 
attenuation, fhe present .study also demonstrates the effects of stimulus 
attentuation, and suggests the confirmation of Upshaw's (19&5) 
conclusions. Thus where items do not fu l l y represent the total range 
of a subject's conceptual position within any defined anchors, i . e . , 
where some area of a subject's understanding of the topic represented 
by the items presented i s re lat ively less represented by items descriptive 
of that position, there i s a tendency to ' f i l l in ' with items 
representing adjacent points of view. Again this w i l l tend to pervert 
a derived scale . Two circumstances may be described which f u l f i l l this 
condition. F i r s t l y , the span of items may not completely cover the 
whole span of a homogeneous population's understanding of the topic 
represented by the items; and secondly, a group may have a concept of the 
topic relatively attenuated at one 'end' and 'extended' at the other. 
Both these instances were demonstrated i n a number of studies on the 
influence of attitude on scale values, most notably Kelley, Hovland, 
Schwartz & Abelson (1955)» Hovland & Sherif (1952) and Upshaw (1962 & 
1965). 
Of special interest in this work i s the confirmation of subjective 
anchors. These were shown to be temporarily established where no obvious 
anchor existed, and to disappear with increasing familiarity with the 
items sorted. In fact this situation i s probably closest to actual test 
construction situations in that the presented anchors are not completely 
related to the items to be scaled without actually being those items. 
One result i s to n u l l i f y the above crit icisms of L iker t ' s and Edwards 
and Ki lpatr ick's item selection techniques since some midrange items w i l l 
tend to be rejected from the former (assuming the apparent correlation 
between the t s ta t i s t i c and interquartile range seen in graphs 2 & 3 i s 
meaningful and signif icantly posit ive) , and selected i n the l a t t er . 
The above sumarises the perturbing influences on item category scale 
values as demonstrated in the present experiments. They may be 
demonstrated as aris ing from the relative attenuation of response c > 
continua or items scaled. The elimination of such perturbations would 
be a significant f i r s t step towards the construction of an 'absolute' 
scale of attitude or semantics as discussed impl ic i t ly in the introduc-
tion above. However, even i f i t were possible to construct and present 
items representing every opinion from zero attitude to inf in i te 
attitude, stimulus attenuation by virtue of a subject's limited concepts 
and experiences would make many litems meaningless, and thus in relation 
to the defined inf in i te response continuum those items which are 
meaningful would be subject to the effects of f i l l i n g in with a l l the 
consequent perturbations in scale value and interquartile range (or 
standard deviation.) 
A further solution would be to free the subject from questions of 
absolute stimulus value, and to consider instead relationships between 
items. I t can more, rationally be stated by a subject 'X has more of the 
attribute than Y ' , than 'X has P amount of the attribute' . Here the 
obvious solution of the problem i s in terms of paired comparisons. 
Thurstone based his law of comparative judgement on the assumption 
that a l l the items presented were unidimensional, and hence indicated 
9?. 
no means for item selection. 
Gutman questioned this assumption (admittedly in the context of 
category scaling) but fai led to show how items existing on different 
dimensions could be separated. Modern technique s and computer technology 
provide adequate models, such as cluster analysis, to accomplish this 
complex task. For reasons stated elsewhere the writer cannot accept 
fhurstone's assumptions i n his case T of the law of comparative judgement. 
Whatever method i s used i n analysing paired comparison data, there 
s t i l l remains the disproportionate increase i n the number of pairs to be 
presented with increasing numbers of items to be examined 
(n^2 * ^Oif-l) y Tb-e most promising method i s an extension of 
Slater 's multiple part ia l ranking. As already indicated, iterative means 
exist for generating sets of items such that p presentations of n items 
( C p pairs per presentation) w i l l represent a l l the constituent G 0 
pairs of an item population m. The limitations of the relationships 
between p, n & m are such that many values of m exist which cannot be 
handled in this way, or for which n i s so small that p i s s t i l l 
u nmanageable. 
I w i l l digress to explain a particular advantage of multiple 
ranking over single presentation methods or simple paired comparisons. 
Much of the var iabi l i ty in the above category experiments can be 
explained as being contributed by the f i r s t few items to be sorted, during 
which the nature of the items i s only partly understood. Thus 'judge-
mental perspectives' change for each of the i n i t i a l items sorted unt i l an 
overall perspective becomes fixed. The distributions of interquartile 
ranges in AP^ and BP^ in experiment B above suggest that this f inal 
perspective was not established at a l l during the presentation of 
AP^, i f the low near midrange interquartile ranges can be taken as 
indicative of a form of primary judgemental perspective. This was 
substantiated in s p i r i t in a subsidiary experiment not reported &boye 
because of the specialised and extreme population used. In this 
experiment a number of theology students sorted P^ in a non random 
order; i . e . , every subject was presented with P^ i n a fixed random 
order. She only finding of note was the general decrease in item 
interquartile range with increasing familiarity with the items. Items 
presented at f i r s t had greater interquartile ranges than items approx-
imately the same size presented at the end., A further finding of 
significant item mean category placing sh i f t as compared to AP^ could 
not be jus t i f i ed because of the nonhomogeneity of the two populations, 
though otherwise i t would have supported the judgemental perspective 
model with the addition of a constant set between subjects. 
As with the tangible unidimensional stimuli of the present 
experiment, so these varying judgemental perspectives w i l l be even more 
strongly manifested where the items presentedare not completely described 
by the presented anchors. Thus judgemental perspectives may shi f t with 
every item presented to represent only one aspect of the current stimulus 
item, within which the anchors become meaningful for that item. This 
i s the situation which Gutman scalogram analysis was designed to detect. 
Consider now paired comparison methodology. I f two items are 
presented, then they must be judged, i f any rational decision can be 
made at a l l , purely on some common aspect of their affective potential. 
Furthermore, the larger the number of items presented in multiple 
part ia l ranking, the more l ike ly i t i s that a l l thelitem population 
w i l l have been judged on the same aspect. Of course, for some items 
this common attribute might be by no means the major attribute; 
however this may be overcome in scale administration by presenting a 
number of the scale items to be assessed concurrently rather than 
discretely. The same problems w i l l be partly overcome in category 
scaling procedures by allowing subjects to familiarise themselves with 
the items before assessing them. 
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To return to the projected extension of irrultiple p a r t i a l ranking, 
where no adequately large n can be found to administer a l l the 
constituent p a i r s i n m conveniently, i t i s projected that s e t s of s i z e s 
n , n-1, n+1, or any s i m i l a r range, should be specified which between 
them would accomplish the presentation of a l l the p a i r s . Furthermore, 
by specifying beforehand the l e v e l of probability at which any item 
p a i r w i l l be deemed s i g n i f i c a n t l y different (binomial t e s t ) , a f t e r a 
number of subjects have been presented with a l l item p a i r s , c e r t a i n 
pairs may be excluded from subsequent subject presentations. With on-
lin e computer techniques t h i s process would be much simplified. The 
l e v e l at which item pairs would be accepted would be related to the 
number of items required i n the f i n a l scale and the degree of 
'misplacement' of item pairs which may be tolerated. 
I m p l i c i t i n the technique suggested here i s an analysis of paired 
comparisons i n no way related to the law of comparative judgement. I f 
a set of items i s unidimensional the above method w i l l s e l e c t a number 
of items, a l l of which are e a s i l y distinguishable one from the other 
(see Experiment C), and i f multidimensional the data w i l l be amenable 
to c l u s t e r analysis to separate them. This does not impute any r e l a t i o n -
ship to any absolute scale value as i n the law of comparative judgement 
case V, which ultimately says nothing about the r e l a t i v e ease of 
discrimination of items so scaled, though items selected by the present 
method could bear a d i r e c t relationship to case I of the law of 
comparative judgement. 
With, enough i n i t i a l items, representing as many shades of opinion 
within the topic to be studied as possible, the present method w i l l s e l e c t 
items so distributed that where affect i s r e l a t i v e l y diffuse, i n that any 
instrument based on absolute scale values would demonstrate r e l a t i v e l y 
low betveen-item variance, selected item density would be r e l a t i v e l y low. 
Thus the sharp cutoff c r i t e r i o n described i n the introduction would be 
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f u l f i l l e d i n that a precise t r a n s i t i o n between scale items would be 
observed, i . e . , the scale would n e c e s s a r i l y have a high Gutman 
coe f f i c i e n t of reproduceability. 
Al l t h e present discussion on paired comparisons r e l i e s on the 
assumption that the degree to which a p a i r of items i s distinguishable i s 
a function of the items' discriminal dispersions and the difference 
between t h e i r modal discriminal processes (law of comparative judgement), 
and that the modal discriminal process i s a simple function of absolute 
scale value. This has not been questioned elsewhere, and w i l l be 
accepted here. 
We may now discuss the r e l a t i v e ease of administration tfcategory 
methods as opposed to the form of paired comparisons discussed above. 
Graph 18 indicates the mean time to discriminate a pair, when that 
p a i r i s administered within a group of siz e N for ranking. This 
indicates a mean time per p a i r i n simple paired comparisons i n the 
order of J . 25 seconds, which accords with i r r e g u l a r and approximate 
times recorded during the administration of experiment G, and not 
recorded here (lm- = 2 .9 s e c ) . 
During' experiment D subjects showed no d i s t r e s s while sorting 
packs of 12 , so l e t us assume that packs i n excess of 12 w i l l produce 
a t of 1 second. I f a l l the items of P-^  had been sorted by multiple 
p a r t i a l ranking, the time taken for a single subject to process a l l the 
constituent pairs would have been about 45 minutes, as against 2-J- hours 
i n simple paired comparisons and 15 minutes for category sorting. 
The question then i s the work load i t i s acceptable to i n f l i c t 
upon a judge/subject. Whereas time taken i n category sorting i s 
probably l i n e a r l y related to the number of items, i n paired comparisons 
there i s an exponential relationship, and the work load becomes 
intolerable as the number of items to be analysed increases. Of course 
some item p a i r s w i l l be accepted a f t e r the f i r s t few subjects, and the 
18 
Mean times to sort a single p a i r 
when that p a i r i s presented as 
a constituent part of N cards 
presented f o r ranking i n Expt D. 
See table 9« 
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work load on subsequent subjects w i l l be progressively reduced. 
However, i f the work load on the f i r s t few subjects themselves i s 
intolerable i t may become expedient to administer only a proportion of 
the item p a i r s , to each i n i t i a l subject, with curious r e s u l t s on the 
subsequent analysis due to i r r e g u l a r item pair sampling over subjects. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
Here we have, then, an attempt to return i n s o c i a l psychophysics to 
a measure of precision beyond that derived from category s c a l i n g and the 
application of case Y of the law of comparative judgements. The form of 
notional analysis i n terras of "binomial distributions and j u s t noticeable 
differences i s not necessaizDy an attempt to establish an absolute scale 
of measured a f f e c t , since i t i s open to p r e c i s e l y the c r i t i c i s m s applied 
to category sorting above. That i s , the j u s t noticeable difference may 
bear a c u r v i l i n e a r or even quadratic relationship to any 'absolute' scale 
values. 
However, insofar as the j u s t noticeable difference from the above 
notional binomial model w i l l represent s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n measured 
af f e c t , i t w i l l eliminate much of the variance associated with confusion 
i n the rank ordering of items selected by methods approximating to a 
function of absolute value. 
I t i s to be regretted that the method of multiple p a r t i a l ranking 
could not be expanded or tested h t h i s paper. Despite the indulgence 
and i n f i n i t e patience of members of Durham University Department of 
Mathematics and Durham University Computer Unit, and also extra-mural 
enquiries, the model of multiple p a r t i a l ranking could not be 
formalised further than i t was expressed above. I n fact, the computer 
hardware for the on-line application was not even available at that time, 
and the soft\<rare awaits the model's mathematical formulation. 
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s nevertheless e x i s t for the application of t h i s 
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technique^ to the quantification of any a f f e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , assuming 
that the form of item used i n attitude methodology and semantic 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s analogous to the c i r c l e s and discs analysed here. 
I n fact these complex a f f e c t i v e items cannot be assumed to be 
unidimensional. However, the princi p l e s of perturbation demonstrated 
here w i l l nevertheless underly, and undermine, any measure taken with 
the techniques described. 
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Table 2 
Raw r e s u l t s of experiment B. 
Categories i n t o which each 
su b j e c t s o r t e d each card; 
cards numbered from smallest 
l a r g e s t ; f o r both packs. 
Also d i s t r i b u t i o n of cards 
over c a t e g o r i e s f o r each 
s u b j e c t , f o r each pack. 
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Table 6 
Raw r e s u l t s of experiment C. 
Also p r o p o r t i o n a l u n i t scale 
s e p a r a t i o n of c o n s t i t u e n t p a i r s 
of each ' t r i p l e t ' . 
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EXPERIMENT D 
RESULTS 
TABLE J 
Raw Results 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A 
9 
250.04 
5 
118.5 
3 
46.5 
0,0,0,0 
12 
459.45 
7 15 
199.62 97.13 
0,2 ,6,8 |o,0,0,0 
9 
222.85 
0} 2 9 2 y 2 
B 
5 
59.68 
9 
94.98 
5 
47.65 
7 
69.66 
0,0,2,4 
9 13 
88.4 20.28 
6,6,8,12 0,0,0,2 
12 
153.58 
7,10,10, 
12 
0 
9 
150.84 
5 9 
144.1 
37 
2,2 ,4 ,8 
5 
55.19 
22 
0 9 O 9 2}2 
12 
202.69 
47 
2,4,14, 
16 
3 
28.44 
13.5 
0,0,0,0 
7 
86.62 
30 
0,0,2,6 
D 
5 
74.44 
9 
155.94 
12 
190.93 
39 
8^12,16, 
9 
92.88 
29 
2 54 ,10, 
3 
22.64 
11 
0,0,2,2 
5 
39.87 
15.5 
0,0,2,4 
7 „ 
59.65 
22 
0,2,4,6 
E 
9 
193.8 
5 
83.76 
7 
116.54 
27 
0,0 ,0,2 
3 
60.75 
11.5 
0,0,0,0 
9 
206.7 
33 
0,0,2,2 
6 
66.85 
19 
0 ^ 0 f 212 
12 
28.44 ' 
42.5 
2,2,8,10 
F 
5 
75.04 
9 
145.85 
7 
95.32 
27 
0 ,0 ,2,4 
5 58.53 
20 
0,0,2,2 
9 
145.44 
33 
2^2,14, 
12 
210.66 
46 
2,4,6,8 
25.I 
12 
0,0,0,0 
G 
9 
132.61 
5 
39.34 
9 
87.73 
40 
0,2,4,6 
7 
49.41 
20 
2,2,6,10 
12 
145.22 
39 
4,4,16, 
3 
21.82 
10 
0,0,0,0 
33.31 
15 
0,0,0,2 
H 
5 
59.43 
9 
129.55 
5 
76.95 
25 
0,0 ,0 ,0 
12 
187.9 
65 
2,4,8,14 
7 
87.03 
30 
0,2,4,8 
9 
138.81 
48 
2,2,2,9 
3 
27.67 
12 
0,0,0,2 | 
I 
146.51 
43 
5 
69.9 
3: 
26.84 
12 
0,0,0,2 
9 
208.31 
42 
2,4,4,12 
114.74 
27 
0,0,4,6 
60.43 
24 
0 ^  0} 2 ^  2 
12 
466.8 
49 
4,4,10,12 
J 
5 
108.12 
9 
369.68 
12 
373 
39 
2,8,10,15 
5 
114.03 
19 
0,0,0,6 
5 
46.64 
13 
0,0,0,0 
9 
243.03 
36 
0,0,0,4 
7 
214.82 
26 
2,2,2,6 
training t r i a l s test t r i a l s 
In each c e l l i s recorded a) 1 number of cards per pack (sorting mode) 
b) T (time for three cycles) in sees. 
c) t (|otal pickup & return time) in sees. 
d) $ d (4 results per set). 
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